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Abstract 
My PhD thesis aimed at contributing to the understanding of the neural implementation of 
action effect prediction. It has been suggested that the prediction of action effects is based on 
the preactivation of the sensory pathway involved in the treatment of the predicted effect (See 
Chapter I.H).  Based on this suggestion we conceived a model of this preactivation hypothesis 
and derived a number of predictions about the perceptual processing of action consequences. 
In this thesis we tested the predictions made by the model (see Chapter II) as well as refined 
the model. 
 
Résumé 
L’objectif du présent doctorat fut de contribuer à la compréhension des mécanismes de 
prédiction des effets de l’action en termes d’implémentation cérébral. Il a été suggéré que la 
prédiction des effets de l’action reposait sur la préactivation du réseau sensoriel impliqué dans 
le traitement de ces effets (voir Chapitre I.H). A partir de cette suggestion nous avons élaboré 
un model de cette hypothèse de preactivation nous permettant de dériver un certain nombre de 
prédictions quant au traitement perceptuel des conséquences de l’action. Au cours de cette 
thèse nous avons testé les prédictions faites par le model de la préactivation pour la prédiction 
des effets de l’action ainsi qu’en raffiner sa modélisation.   
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Prologue 
“Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to bring 
them up in and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any 
type of specialist I might select – doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief and, yes, even 
beggar-man and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, 
vocations, and race of his ancestors. I am going beyond my facts and I admit it, but so 
have the advocates of the contrary and they have been doing it for many thousands of 
years.” J.Watson 
It is difficult to tell a story without also sketching its context. That is why I start with a 
citation from one of the fathers of cognitive psychology: J.Watson. I choose this citation 
for two reasons. First, because I see in it the expression of the author’s desire for 
equality. In the author’s mind equality between humans can be obtained through the 
plasticity of cognitive systems. Second, the citation brings us back to the core meaning of 
cognition. The latin verb ‘cognoscere’ refers to the abstract acquisition of knowledge, the 
getting to know, the ability to comprehend. According to J.Watson this ability to 
comprehend is shaped through the interaction between the agent and the environment.  In 
his view, cognitive systems are designed by their constant interaction with the 
environment. These interactions and the mechanisms they involve are precisely the topic 
of the Cognitive Sciences. Perception, action, communication, memory, reasoning, and 
emotion are all part of this interaction.  
The most essential components of a cognitive system are perception and action. Every 
cognitive system, even the most basic one, has the ability to interact with its environment 
by detecting changes in it and reacting to these changes. This reaction can be either a 
modification of the state of the organism (for example the depression of the immune 
system after a stressful stimulus) or of the environment (for example building a shelter 
when rain is coming), or both. As an extreme position, one could say that every other 
cognitive function ‘merely’ helps optimizing this basic adaptive function of the 
perception-action cycle. This prologue is meant to underscore how general the interest of 
the research outlined below is.      
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A. Perception-Action Continuum 
 
Already behaviorism considered action and perception to be un-dissociable. As a matter 
of fact, classical conditioning cannot be described without both perception and action. 
Classical conditioning, introduced by Pavlov (1927), refers to the fact that, after being 
conditioned, a neutral stimulus (NS) can elicit a conditional response (CR). This 
conditional response shall be a reflex response or an unconditional response (UR) to an 
unconditional stimulus (US). After the systematic temporal contiguity of NS and US, NS 
will become a Conditional Stimulus (CS), such that the basic behavioral relationship US 
 UR is extended to CS  CR, by introducing a phase during which   NS US.  
Note that at the end CS=NS and CR=UR.  
In other words, in cognitive systems the natural response to a stimulus can be transferred 
to another stimulus. This demonstrates two things. First the plasticity of the cognitive 
system, and secondly, the fact that even a reflex action can be modulated by the central 
nervous system, or at least the central nervous system is able to extend a reflex to stimuli 
which were not initially supposed to elicit that reaction. It appear that through its 
associative nature the cognitive system is optimized to adapt its response to others 
stimuli.  
However, the link between perception and action exists also from action to perception. 
Thorndike (1898), followed by Skinner (1937) and many others, introduced a paradigm 
in which action-effect relationships are crucial. Instrumental, Operant or Skinnerian 
conditioning refers to the fact that if an action outcome is rewarding for the organism 
then the behavior triggering the reward will increase in frequency over time. In this 
paradigm, the targeted behavior is not a reflex but a spontaneous action. That is to say, by 
manipulating the contingencies between a spontaneous behavior and a rewarding 
stimulus, it is possible to control the probability of the behavior’s occurrence.  
Behaviorism studied mainly the influence of action effects (in this case the 
reward/punishment) on the occurrence of the behavior. Thus the conditioned operant 
behavior appears to be goal-directed and share more characteristics with voluntary 
behavior since the behavior is maintained by its consequences, whereas a classical 
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conditioned response shares more characteristics with reflex or automatic behavior since 
it is maintained only by the association established between the neutral and the 
unconditional stimulus (Domjan, 2003).   
Of course it would be wrong to draw a strict line between both action types, especially so 
given the complexity of the human cognitive system. However, despite the difficulty to 
precisely and exhaustively define the concepts of “voluntary action” and “stimulus-
driven action”, cognitive neuroscience tried to shed light on the commonalities and 
differences between these two types of actions.     
 
B. Neurophysiological approach: TWO action 
networks 
 
 With the progress in imaging techniques scientists were able to investigate brain 
activity during voluntary and stimulus driven actions. A stimulus-driven action is a 
movement in response to an external event. These stimulus-driven actions will usually be 
responses issued as fast as possible to a stimulus. Hence, the event triggering the action is 
exogenous. Of course, the response (especially in human behavior) is actually done with 
the agents’ consent, so it is actually rather misleading to call it “involuntary”. However, 
usually stimulus-driven actions are highly trained actions. That is, they are automatic in 
that they need less processing than untrained actions.  
In contrast, “voluntary” actions are induced by an endogenous cause. That is, they are 
triggered by some internal decision to act. Here, again, the term “voluntary” is actually 
misleading when used with respect to actions investigated in the laboratory, since the 
participants usually receive a number of instructions concerning which actions to 
perform, and when.   
A number of paradigms demonstrated the existence of different but interrelated networks 
for Operant and Automatic action control (for a review see Haggard, 2008). The end 
point of both networks first appeared to be the primary motor cortex (M1) that projects 
directly to the muscles via the spinal cord. M1 seems to receive information from both 
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the voluntary action and the stimulus driven path (Sherrington, 1906). By contrast, others 
areas involved in action control and selection tend to show preference for voluntary or 
stimulus-driven actions (Dum & Strick, 2002a). For example in case of voluntary action, 
M1 receives input from the pre-supplementary motor area (preSMA) and the 
supplementary motor area (SMA), which receives input from both basal ganglia and 
prefrontal cortex (Deiber et al., 1999; Jenkins, Jahanshahi, Jueptner, Passingham, Brooks, 
2000; Picard & Strick, 1996). SMA and PreSMA have been demonstrated to show 
stronger activation for self-generated than for externally triggered actions. EEG studies 
have shown a long and increasing negativity beginning around 1 second or more before 
the onset of voluntary movements. This activity is thought to be caused by the activation 
of the preSMA/SMA complex (Lang, et al., 1991; Shibasaki & Halett, 2006; Yazawa et 
al., 2000), suggesting that this area might be one of the key areas of voluntary action 
genesis. The onset of this activity, usually called readiness potential, is considered to be 
the initiation of a cascade of neural activity causing action. As Figure 1 (panel a) 
illustrates, the voluntary action network is distributed across the brain and includes also 
areas other than M1 and the preSMA/SMA complex.   
 
Figure 1 : panel a) Voluntary action network; panel b) automatic action network. From Haggard (2008). 
 
As concerns stimulus-driven actions (see Figure 1 panel b), it is thought that processing 
takes place notably in sensory areas, the parietal lobe and lateral premotor cortex. This 
latter area then projects to M1 (Rizzolati, Lupino & Matelli, 1998). 
 9 
 
Recent studies indicate that this dissociation might not be as strict as it first appeared. 
Notably, it has been shown that motor preparation during voluntary action can be 
transferred to stimulus-driven actions (Hughes, Schütz-Bosbach & Waszak, 2011). This 
might be taken to indicate that, just as behavior can be situated somewhere between fully 
automatic (such like the myotatic reflex) and fully “voluntary” (such like going to the 
cinema alone), action-related brain networks can be more or less involved during action 
preparation depending on the origin (endogenous or exogenous) and the complexity of 
the action.  
However, despite the lack of a strict distinction between voluntary and stimulus driven 
action, the use of distinct concepts is useful. For example, experimental research 
demonstrated a number of effects which arise notably in the presence of voluntary action, 
notably sensory attenuation and intentional binding.  
As will be outlined below, sensory attenuation and intentional binding are thought to be 
related to action effect anticipation. Recent studies suggest the involvement of two motor 
areas in the anticipation of action effects (SMA and M1). Haggard and Whitford (2004) 
showed that Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) pulses disrupting the SMA 
abolish sensory attenuation. They suggest that the SMA is in charge of the generation of 
action-effect anticipation (see also Voss, Ingram, Haggard, & Wolpert, 2006). More 
recently, Hughes and Waszak (2011), using EEG, explored pre-movement differences 
between an action-to-effect and an action only condition, that is between conditions in 
which an action-effect was predicted or not, respectively. Rather than observing 
differences in the readiness potential (RP; a slow negative deflection in the EEG thought 
to reflect unspecific motor preparation in SMA observed 1-2s before action execution), 
the authors observed an increased lateralized readiness potential (LRP observed 700-
400ms before action execution) for action-to-effect trials compared to action-only trials. 
The LRP is thought to reflect lateralized action-specific activation in M1 (e.g., Haggard 
& Eimer, 1999; Hughes et al., 2011; Hughes & Waszak, 2011; Leuthold & Jentzsch, 
2002; Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983), suggesting that the M1 might be involved 
in the prediction of action–effect.  
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C. Specific effects in voluntary action 
 
Two effects are typically associated with the execution/preparation of voluntary actions, 
namely sensory attenuation and intentional binding.  
Sensory attenuation refers to the observation that action consequences are attenuated both 
in terms of their phenomenology and their cortical response (Gallistel, 1986; Schafer & 
Marcus, 1973). Sensory attenuation is commonly illustrated by the fact that it is 
impossible to tickle oneself (cf. Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1998; Weiskrantz, Elliott, 
& Darlington, 1971). Blakemore et al. (1998) investigated sensory attenuation using a 
robotic arm. Participants controlled this arm while it made tickling movements on 
themselves. They observed that the activity in the somatosensory cortex was reduced 
when the participant was in control of the robotic arm compared to the condition in 
which the robotic arm was controlled by the experimenter.  
Sensory attenuation has also been studied using psychophysical paradigms assessing 
perception. For example, using subjective reports, Blakemore, Frith, and Wolpert (1999) 
showed that the introduction of a temporal or spatial distortion between the subjects’ 
movement and the robot’s reaction caused an increased feeling of ticklishness. The 
phenomenon of sensory attenuation has also been observed in other than the tactile 
modality. In the auditory domain, it has been observed that self-generated sounds are 
perceived as less intense than externally generated sounds (Sato, 2008). In the visual 
domain, using methods based on signal detection theory, it has been shown that predicted 
action-effects are less well detected compared to unpredicted action-effects (Cardoso-
Leite et al., 2010). This is in agreement with neurophysiological findings showing 
attenuated cortical responses when stimuli are self-generated (Aliu, Houde, & Nagarajan, 
2009; Baess, Jacobsen, & Schröger, 2008; Blakemore et al., 1998; 1999; Martikainen, 
Kaneko, & Hari, 2005; Gentsch & Schütz-Bosbach, 2011). 
Thus, it appears that the neural processing of stimuli generated by a voluntary action is 
different compared to the processing of the same stimuli but externally generated.  
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In a similar way studies investigating intentional binding observed that events that are 
generated by a voluntary action are perceived as occurring earlier in time compared to 
the same events when externally generated (e.g., Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002, for 
a review see Moore & Obhi, 2012). Haggard et al., (2002) demonstrated this effect by 
adapting the clock method originally used by Libet et al., (1983) to assess the perceived 
time of a conscious decision to move. In their study participants executed voluntary 
actions (key-presses) which triggered the occurrence of an auditory stimulus (a tone). 
Participants were then asked to indicate the time of occurrence of their action or of the 
tone by reporting the position of the clock-hand when these events occurred. This 
condition was compared to a condition in which the tone was preceded by an involuntary 
muscle twitch induced by Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS). Haggard and 
colleagues observed that voluntary actions were perceived as occurring later in time 
compared to involuntary movements. Similarly, the tone was perceived as occurring 
earlier in time when generated by a voluntary movement compared to when it was 
preceded by an involuntary movement. Accordingly action and its outcome were 
perceived as occurring close together in time. This intentional binding phenomenon has 
been replicated using other methods such as temporal order judgments (Cravo, Claessens, 
& Baldo, 2011), interval replication tasks (Humphreys & Buehner, 2009, 2010) and 
interval estimation (Engbert, Wohlsschäger, Thomas & Haggard, 2007; Engbert & 
Wohlsschäger, 2007).  
 
D. Predictive Mechanisms and voluntary action 
 
During the last decade researchers aimed at investigating the neural and functional 
mechanisms underlying intentional binding and sensory attenuation. 
It has been suggested that the difference in the processing of self vs. externally generated 
events depends on differences in the prediction of self-generated and externally generated 
stimuli (Blakemore et al., 1999; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000).  Wolpert, Ghahramani 
and Jordan (1995) proposed a model of sensorimotor integration that involves inverse 
and forward models. Inverse models determine the appropriate motor command to 
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achieve a goal given a particular sensory state; while forward models predict the 
expected sensory consequence of the action given the motor command (see Figure2). 
 
Figure 2 : Representation of a Forward model determining the sensory consequence of an action. When an action is 
performed the motor command generates an efference copy, this allows the systems to predict the sensory 
consequences of the action (corollary discharge). This prediction will be compared to the actual outcome of the action. 
If the prediction and the outcome matches, the prediction is cancelled from the experience, resulting in sensory 
attenuation. From Waszak et al. (2012) adapted from Frith, Blakemore and Wolpet (2000).  
These models are similar to the concept of corollary discharge. The corollary discharge is 
a copy of the motor program (referred to as efference copy; see Figure 2) fed into the 
sensory network to predict the consequences of the action (for a review see Bridgeman 
1995). One of the most popular examples of corollary discharge can be found in the 
mormyrid electric fish (Bell, 1989; Bell & Grant, 1989). This particular type of fish is 
able to generate an electrical field used for electrolocation and electrocomunication 
through an organ named electric organ discharge (EOD). It is also, able to perceive 
electrical fields. It has been shown that the cortical regions responsible to process the 
electrical afferences are activated at the time of the EOD motor activity through electric 
organ corollary discharge (EOCD). More evidence to support the fact that sensory 
systems respond to cues generated by an animal's own behavior has been provided, for 
example, by Poulet and Hedwig (2007). In humans, the ability of cognitive systems to 
predict action effects has been supported by a number of studies (Miall, Weir, Wolpert, 
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1993; Kawato, 1999; Wolpert et al., 1995, Blakemore et al., 1998, 1999; for a review see 
Desmurget & Grafton, 2000).  
The use of these sensory predictions is threefold. First, it allows the system to prepare the 
next motor command given the consequences of the first in a sequential action process, 
such as playing the piano or video gaming (inverse model). Second, it allows the 
comparison of the prediction to the actual feedback resulting in a prediction error when 
they do not match (forward model). This error had been thought to be an important 
component to learning (Wolpert & Kawato, 1998) and the basis of sensory attenuation. 
For example, Blakemore and colleagues (1998, 1999) hypothesize that a match between 
the actual and the predicted consequence would result in a ‘subtraction’ of the prediction 
from the actual effect. This subtraction would be reflected in the decrease in observed 
neural activity, and the attenuation of the perceived strength of the stimulus Third the 
prediction of the sensory consequences will be compared to the goal for fine tuning of the 
motor command before the actual sensory feedback (feed-forward model; see Desmurget 
& Grafton, 2000). It has been proposed that Intentional Binding, too, may rely on the 
same internal model mechanisms (Haggard & Clark, 2003). However the predictive 
origin of intentional binding was subject to debate and until now remains unclear. 
According to Moore and Obhi (2012) the fact that intentional binding is specific to 
voluntary movements suggests the implication of motor based predictive processes. This 
conclusion is corroborated by a study from Haggard and Clark (2003) who investigated 
intentional binding in the case of disrupted motor intentions. To do so they applied, in 
some blocks, a random TMS pulse while participants made voluntary key presses. Doing 
so, they were able to disrupt the completion of intentional actions by triggering identical 
involuntary movements. They found that intentional binding was weakened in these 
trials. They concluded that the intention to produce the tone was necessary to evoke 
intentional binding. According to this view, intentional binding is a consequence of 
processes involved in the preparation of intentional action.  
However more recently, further experiments investigating the perceived time of an action 
demonstrated that both predictive and retrospective mechanism are involved in 
intentional binding (Engbert & Wohlschläger, 2007; Moore & Haggard, 2008; Moore, 
Wegner, Haggard, 2009; Moore & Haggard., 2010). For example, Moore and Haggard 
(2008) investigated the contribution of prediction and retrospective inference, 
respectively, to the action component of intentional binding (i.e., the perceived onset of 
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the action). Participants were instructed to report the time of the onset of their voluntary 
action on a Libet clock. In one condition, the key press generated a tone on 75% of trials 
(predictable condition). In another condition the key press produced a tone on 50% of 
trials (unpredictable condition). By comparing the perceived time of action in the trials 
without tone of the predictable and the unpredictable condition they were able to assess 
the contribution of predictability to intentional binding. They found an increased shift in 
the perceived time of action in the predictable condition, indicating the implication of 
predictive mechanisms in the effect. By comparing the perceived time of action in the 
unpredictable blocks between the trials with and without tone they could assess the 
retrospective contribution of the tone apparition to intentional binding. They found that 
the presence of the tone shifted the perception of the action’s onset toward the tone, 
suggesting that the presence of the tone retrospectively influenced the perceived action 
time. The authors concluded that intentional binding emerges from both predictive and 
retrospective cues (see also Moore et al., 2009).  
However, note that the study of Moore and Haggard (2008; see also Moore et al., 2009) 
concerned only the perceived time of action. It is, thus, unclear whether the same 
mechanisms are responsible for the shift of the perceived onset of the action’s sensory 
consequence. So far the only conclusion that can be drawn from these experiments is that 
the perceived time shift of the action is influenced by both predictive and retrospective 
cues, while the mechanisms responsible for the perceived time shift of the action effect 
remains unclear (cf., Hughes, Desantis & Waszak, 2013, more detail about this topic will 
be provided in the general discussion). 
Even if the role of motor prediction in intentional binding remains unclear, it appears that 
the prediction of the sensory consequence of the action plays a central role in voluntary 
action control. So far the forward/inverse model is the best candidate to account for the 
cognitive processes underlying voluntary action. Pacherie (2008) recently proposed to 
use the notion of forward models not only to explain sensory attenuation and intentional 
binding but also to provide a more general framework for a wide range of phenomena 
related to the “will”. 
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E. From the forward model to a more precise 
conception of voluntary action 
 
Pacherie (2008) proposed a multifactorial model of action control to explain a large 
number of phenomena such as the sense of agency, free will, awareness of action goals, 
awareness of movements, sense of activity, sense of control, experience of authorship, 
experience of intentionality, and experience of mental causation. Most important in the 
context of the present thesis is how this framework relates the two effects outlined above 
(sensory attenuation and intentional binding) with a more general conception of how 
voluntary action is implemented in the mind, using the forward/inverse model 
conception. The concept of voluntary action implies that the agent performs a motor act 
caused by internal mental processes or ‘intentions’. Most philosophers working on the 
concept of intention concluded that it refers to multiple processes in action initiation, 
guidance and control (Searle, 1983; Bratman, 1987; Mele, 1992; Pacherie, 2007). The 
same holds for Pacherie (2008) who considers intentions to be hierarchically organized, 
and each level of intention to have a dynamics with two phases. The upstream dynamics 
results in the formation of the intention and the downstream dynamics result in its 
execution.  
In Pacherie’s framework (2008) distal (D-)intentions are high level cognitive processes 
directed toward future events. On this level the upstream dynamics, e.g., the dynamics of 
decision-making that lead to the formation of an intention, involves the selection of a 
goal. In its downstream dynamics, D-intentions are concerned with the guidance and the 
monitoring of the action. They are maintained in prospective memory until they are no 
more necessary, and they ensure by means of the downstream dynamics the proper 
control of the action.   
Proximal (P-)intentions often ‘inherit’ an higher-order action plan from a D-intention. Its 
role is to anchor the action plan in the current context, such as temporal anchoring or the 
decision to start acting. In the upstream dynamics they are formed by the integration of 
the conceptual information from the D-intention with the perceptual information of the 
current context and the behavioral possibilities of the agent. This dynamics results in a 
more concrete representation of the action. In the downstream dynamics, P-intentions 
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ensure the guidance and the control of the action in the context of the action. In this 
framework both intentional binding and sensory attenuation are caused by the 
comparison of the predicted outcome and the actual feedback at the P-level.  
The third type of intentions are motor (M-)intentions. These intentions refer to the motor 
representation of the action in terms of a precise neural code. Their upstream dynamics 
leads to the selection of the appropriate motor program. In their downstream dynamics 
the precise parameters of the motor commands are set and the movement is adjusted 
during its execution. 
 
Figure 3: Hierarchical model of action specification based on the Inverse/Forward model framework. Each level of 
intention in the process of action specification functions as a forward/inverse model, in constant interaction with the 
others levels. From Pacherie, 2008.  
 
To sum up, according to Pacherie’s framework (2008), voluntary action may depend on a 
cascade of three levels of intentions. These three levels are tightly linked and are 
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constituted by forward and inverse models (see Figure 3). That is to say, the precision of 
the representation of the goal on one hand and the action on the other depends on the 
intentional level. For example, if I sit in my living room and the sun is not shining yet, 
then I may form the intention to switch on the light. However at this stage the 
representation of my goal is abstract (I want more light), and so is my action 
representation. At the time of my decision to act my representations are already more 
precise. The kinematics of my movements are set as a function of the context (for 
example obstacles between the current position of my arm and the switch), and the goal 
representation includes what will happen in terms of a proprioceptive and somatosensory 
states. The execution of the movement involves a very precise representation of the 
muscles to use in order to achieve the goal. Along with this latter representation goes a 
precise prediction of the proprioceptive consequence of the action and a precise 
representation of the goal on a sensory level. This idea that the action’s goals are at a 
certain stage represented on a sensory level is in line with the ideomotor principle, which 
states that actions are coded in terms of their perceptual consequences. 
 
 
F. The Ideomotor Theory 
 
First introduced by German philosophy (Herbart, 1816; Lotze, 1852; Harless, 1861), the 
term ideomotor action has later been picked up by William James (1950). In his terms, it 
refers to the initiation of “movement upon the mere thought of it” (p. 522). James proposed 
that a direct relation between a desired “idea” and a movement are necessary to generate a 
voluntary movement. In other words, ideomotor action necessitates an association between 
actions and their consequences. Ideomotor actions, thus, are represented in terms of the 
actions’ effect (for reviews see Shin, Proctor & Capaldi, 2010; Stock & Stock, 2004). 
 
Greenwald (1970) was the first to address the notion of ideomotor action experimentally.  
Based on his experiments, he concluded that sensory consequence of an action is critical for 
action control. He suggested that three events are necessary in ideomotor action, the 
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Stimulus (S), the Response (R), and the Effect (E). According to Greenwald repetition of 
the sequence S-R-E results in an association between the events S and E, such that S will 
evoke the representation of E in a “conditioned anticipatory image of response feedback”. 
According to Greenwald the activation of this anticipatory image will, even in the absence 
of the stimulus, trigger the associated response. When the “anticipatory image” actually 
triggers the action then the action is not a basic response to a stimulus anymore but rather a 
goal directed action. This goal directed action relies on the fact that a stimulus or a context 
induces the activation of the anticipatory image of the consequence and, therefore, activates 
the appropriate motor code.  
The ideomotor theory is also strongly reverberated in the Theory of event coding (TEC, 
Hommel, Müssler, Aschersleben & Prinz 2001). The TEC framework hypothesizes a 
common representational system of perception and action codes. This hypothesis is based 
on several assumptions such as: Perceived and to-be-produced events are represented in a 
common domain; actions are represented in a similar distributed fashion as perception; 
event codes are structured within several hierarchical levels (Hommel et al., 2001; for more 
detail see, Shin et al., 2010). In this framework, as in a more general view of the ideomotor 
principle, event codes for action and perception refer to the same distal features in the 
environment, coded in terms of the perceiver-and-environment relation. TEC and 
ideomotor theory, thus, state that the shared code between action and perception should be 
a reference to distal events in the environment (Prinz, 1997; Hommel et al, 2001). One 
might also think of this code as a modality-free representation of objects, comprising 
information about the object and the possible interactions that the system can have with this 
object. This concept of distal coding shares characteristics with the concepts of 
“affordance” (Gibbson, 1977) in the sense that action does not require the transformation of 
the contents of the perceptual analysis into actionable codes. This concept of affordance has 
been demonstrated experimentally in a number of studies (Grèzes & Decety, 2002; Grèzes, 
Tucker, Armony, Ellis, & Passingham, 2003; Tucker & Ellis, 1998).     
 
There are several lines of evidence demonstrating that the cognitive system  acquires 
bidirectional associations between actions and their effects and that these associations are 
used to initiate voluntary actions by the internal anticipation of the action’s outcome ( 
Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Greenwald, 1970; Herwig, Prinz & Waszak, 2007;  Hoffman, 
Sebald & Stöcker, 2001; Kunde, 2001; Waszak & Herwig, 2007; Ziessler, 1998; see also 
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the common coding theory, e.g. Hommel et al., 2001; Prinz, 1997).  For example, Elsner 
and Hommel (2001) trained participants to associate left- and right-hand keypresses with 
the presentation of high and low frequency tones. In the test phase participants had to 
respond to the tones that had previously been the outcome of their actions. The participants 
who had to respond to the tone with a congruent mapping (e.g. with the same hand they 
used to generate the effect) were significantly faster and more accurate than the participant 
who had to respond with the opposite mapping. This highlights that an action can be 
influenced by a previously associated effect stimulus. More recent replications and 
extensions of this effect show that selection and execution or preparation of an action 
involves the internal anticipation of the specific sensory effect predicted by the action 
(Kunde, 2003; Pfister, Kiesel, & Melcher, 2010; Waszak & Herwig, 2007). These studies, 
therefore, support the idea that actions are selected by the internal prediction of the specific 
action outcome. 
Some authors also suggested that an ideomotor mechanism could serve an evaluative 
function of the match between the action outcome and the intended effect (Band, van 
Steenbergen, Ridderinkhof, Falkenstein, & Hommel, 2009; Ziessler, Nattkemper & 
Frensch, 2004). This notion has already been mentioned above in the context of 
inverse/forward models (Wolpert, et al., 1995). To give one example that is rarely discussed 
in the literature, eliminating sensory feedback by destroying the sense organ that signals the 
leg position of insects does not result in the disruption of locomotion. However, a 
continuous distortion of the sensory feedback does (that is, when the organ gives wrong 
information about the leg position). This suggests that, once acquired, the anticipatory 
image of the action consequences is sufficient to induce action. But a systematical 
distortion of the sensory feedback results in drastic impairments of motor performance 
(Bässler, 1977, 1983, 1987).  
One might go to such lengths as to claim that ‘intention’ is precisely this ability to select an 
action by activating a desired consequence. This relation between intention and the ability 
to select an action by activating the desired consequence can be found in Ziessler et al. 
(2004). In this experiment participant had to produce a visual stimulus with a particular key 
press (right or left for example) in response to a given target. Such that for example they 
had to respond to the target “W” with a right key press which will produce a “Y” on the 
screen. They learned different mapping between targets, responses and outcomes during the 
acquisition phases. During this acquisition phase the outcome of the response was either a 
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specific letter either a specific digit (50% of the outcome of a right press response to a “W” 
was a “Y” and 50% was a “2”). During the acquisition phase, half of the participants were 
instructed to generate letters as outcome of their action, and the other half to generate digits. 
Such that for one group the outcome “letter” was considered to be an intended outcome 
while the outcome “digit” was considered to be not intentionally generated and reciprocally 
for the other group. In the test phase they tested Response-Effect learning by assessing the  
reaction time to the target flanked with distractors (for example for group 1 subject had to 
respond to “2W2” or “YWY”). They founded Response-Effect learning (e.g. facilitation in 
reaction time due to flankers) only for the instructed effect in the acquisition phase and 
therefore concluded that learning of action effects occurs only for the intended events. In 
other words action-effect learning appears to be related to intention. 
 
G. Intention and action-effect prediction 
This chapter is based on: Desantis, A., Roussel , C., & Waszak, F. (2011). On 
the influence of causal beliefs on the feeling of agency. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 20(4), 1211–1220.  
 
The study of Desantis, Roussel, & Waszak (2011) also supports the notion of a tight 
relationship between intention and the prediction of an action’s outcome. They manipulated 
participants’ prior belief of causality (belief of agency) and assessed whether this 
manipulation modulated intentional binding. Participants were made to believe that an 
auditory stimulus was either triggered by themselves or by somebody else (a confederate of 
the experimenter), although, in reality, the sound was always triggered by the participants. 
They used the Libet-clock method to measure intentional binding (Haggard et al., 2002; 
Libet et al., 1983). They predicted that intentional binding would be larger when 
participants are convinced that their action triggered the tone, compared to when they 
believe that somebody else’s action triggered the tone. As outlined above intentional 
binding is thought to rely on the prediction of the sensory consequences of the action 
(Haggard & Clark, 2003; Pacherie, 2008). An effect of prior beliefs on intentional binding 
would, thus, imply that intentional binding is a consequence of our prior beliefs about the 
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causality between our action and their outcomes. Similarly to Ziessler et al. (2004, see 
above), where the intention to produce a stimulus is necessary to induce Response-Effect 
learning, here the intention to produce the tone (driven by the belief of agency) would be 
necessary to induce intentional binding.  
The study that is outlined in more detail in the appendix (1) provides support for this 
hypothesis. Desantis et al. (2011) found that the perceived time of a tone was significantly 
shifted when participants were convinced that their actions triggered the tone, compared to 
when they were convinced that the confederate’s action triggered the tone. Notice that both 
belief conditions matched in terms of temporal expectancy and action, the tone was always 
triggered by the participants’ actions and the participant’s actions were always identical. 
As one possible explantation, Desantis et al. (2011) referred to the comparator model 
of motor control to account for their finding. According to the comparator model of motor 
control, internal prediction is used to provide internal feedback of the predicted outcome of 
an action which can be used before sensory feedback is available, thereby shifting earlier in 
time the perceived occurrence of action effects (Wolpert, 1997; Pacherie, 2008; Haggard & 
Clark, 2003). This would suggest that the prediction is somehow contingent on the 
causality belief, since in the experiment the perceived time shift occurs only when the 
subjects believed to produce the outcome.  
According to the ideomotor theory action is driven and selected by its consequence. In 
such a scenario the same action could be generated by different predicted consequences 
depending on the subject’s intentions. For example the key press may be driven by the tone 
representation in the subject belief condition since s/he intended to produce the tone, while 
this same key press might be only driven by proprioceptive and somato-sensory 
representation in the confederate condition. This claim is in line with the fact that 
Response-Effect learning is elicited only for instructed outcome (Ziessler et al. (2004) see 
previous part for more details). This argument is supported by the fact that no significant 
shift of the perceived stimulus onset-time was found in the confederate condition. As a 
matter of fact if the perceived time of the stimulus depends on the prediction of that 
stimulus, then no prediction about the tone was made in the confederate condition. See 
Appendix 1 for more details about this study. 
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H. Outcome prediction: A stimulus specific 
preactivation? 
 
According to previous findings the prediction of the sensory consequences of actions 
plays a central role in motor intentions and voluntary action control. However, the 
question of how the brain implements this prediction remains open. 
It has been shown that the preSMA/SMA complex (see Chapter I.B), M1 and the 
cerebellum are key regions in action driven prediction of sensory action outcomes; 
however, very little is known about the content of the prediction and the way the brain 
produces it. As a matter of course, this question is tightly related to the question of how 
the external world is represented in the brain. It is commonly assumed that the brain 
possesses a neural code representing external events and objects. Obviously, the ability to 
predict an event might be the ability to activate the representation of this event before it 
actually happens. One question in this context is what is the neural code referring to the 
event.  
It has been shown that the brain works in a modular fashion (Fodor, 1983). This 
modularity is reflected in the fact that higher-order cognitive functions (such as language, 
perception …) are subdivided into more or less autonomous sub functions.  It has also 
been shown that these sub-functions, even at the single cell level, constitute an 
integration of the information, one example being the integration of retinal cells into on-
off cells. As a matter of fact, if it is undeniable that neurons are tuned to respond to a 
limited range of stimulus, there is growing evidence that world events are represented by 
patterns of activation, rather than the mere response of localized cells. To give one 
example, Del cul et al. (2007) demonstrated that the conscious perception of a visual 
stimulus relies on activation in a loop of occipital, pre-frontal, and temporal regions.  
According to the view that an object representation consists in the stream of activity it 
evokes from sensory to higher order areas, the prediction of a specific event/object might 
involve (at least partially) the  activation of this stream from high order integrative areas 
to the sensory cortex. Hence according to the ideomotor theory, preparing or executing 
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an action associated to an outcome should pre-activate the sensory pathway that 
represents the expected effect (Waszak, Cardoso-Leite & Hughes, 2012, see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Schematic representation of the preactivation hypothesis through bidirectional associations. Left Panel) 
Activity induced by a visual stimulus. Right panel) The activation of a motor network will induce activity in sensory 
areas. When the stimulus is processed the activity globally increases in the sensory cortex. 
 
This notion is supported by recent findings using neurophysiological methods. Kühn, 
Seunrinck, Fias & Waszak (2010), for example, harnessed the modularity of perceptual 
category representation in the human brain to assess action-induced activity in areas 
involved in the perception of particular classes of stimuli. They made participants acquire 
an association between left and right button presses and face and house stimuli, 
respectively, as action effects. During the test phase, participants continued to make left- 
and right-hand responses but no action-effects were presented. Nonetheless, they observed 
that activity in fusiform face area (FFA, which shows selective activation for faces, e.g. 
Kanwisher, McDermott & Chun, 1997) was increased for actions associated to face stimuli, 
whereas activity in the parahippocampal place area (PPA, which shows selective activation 
for places, e.g., Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998) was increased for actions associated to house 
stimuli. Note that these activations were observed in the absence of any visual stimulation. 
It is thus the action itself that induces activity in FFA and PPA. The results thus 
demonstrate that performing an action entails activity in perceptual areas as if the 
anticipated sensory action effect is actually perceived, corroborating the notion of action-
induced preactivation in perceptual networks representing the expected sensory effects. 
(For a review of functional and neurophysiological mechanisms of effect anticipation see 
Waszak et al., 2012.)  
 24 
 
Preactivation had also been suggested by Cardoso-Leite et al. (2010) to explain sensory 
attenuation. Along the lines of the ideomotor theory, they suggested that discrimination of 
the signal activation (of the real stimulus) from the pedestal level (due to this preactivation) 
is more difficult than discrimination of the signal activation from the baseline level (i.e., in 
a condition without effect anticipation, in which baseline activity is not raised to pedestal 
levels). This reasoning relies on the Signal Detection Theory (SDT) and will be explained 
in detail in the next part. 
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II. Preactivation Theory 
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A. Study 1: A model of neural Preactivation 
This chapter is based on: Roussel , C., Hughes, G., & Waszak, F. (2013). A 
preactivation account of sensory attenuation. Neuropsychologia, 51 (5), 
922–929. 
According to signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966; McMillan & Creelman, 
1991) a sensory process transforms the stimulus energy into an internal response (or 
representation) and a decision process decides on each trial whether or not to consider the 
stimulus to be present based on the current value of the internal response and the decision 
criterion. The difference in the mean and standard deviation of the distributions of 
internal responses elicited in trials in which the stimulus is physically present ("signal" 
distribution) vs. in which the stimulus is physically absent ("noise" distribution) 
characterizes sensitivity (d’). The higher d’ (i.e., the further apart the two distributions 
are), the better the perceptual system is able to differentiate signal from noise. The 
decision or response criterion (c) is the value that the internal response has to exceed in 
order for the participant to report the stimulus to be present. The lower c, the smaller are 
the internal responses that the perceptual system still accepts as "stimulus present". 
Cardoso-Leite et al. (2010) assessed participants’ detection performance to stimuli (tilted 
Gabor patches presented at detection threshold in 50% of the trials) in three different 
conditions: The stimuli were triggered by an action involving the internal anticipation of 
a learned visual effect that is either 1) congruent or 2) incongruent to the to-be-detected 
threshold stimulus, or 3) neutral. Using signal detection methodology (Green & Swets, 
1966) Cardoso-Leite et al. were able to test for the influence of the congruency between 
anticipated and actual action effect on the detection of the latter, separately for sensitivity 
(d’) and response criterion (c). They found that sensitivity (d’) was reduced in the 
congruent condition compared to the neutral and incongruent conditions, reflecting 
sensory attenuation. At the same time the response criterion (c) was identical in the three 
conditions. This suggests that internal action-effect anticipation truly affects perception. 
That is, signal and noise distributions overlap more with than without internal effect 
anticipation.  
But how, precisely, does internal effect anticipation result in larger overlap of signal and 
noise distributions? One possible scenario is that the signal distribution draws closer to 
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the noise distribution because the anticipated sensory effect is inhibited (see Figure 5, 
panel a). While many studies do not state a precise mechanism to explain sensory 
attenuation, some seem to reverberate the notion of a predictive inhibition as they state 
that the predicted effect is "subtracted" from the actual sensory effect or that the 
predicted effect is "cancelled" (Bays, Flanagan, & Wolpert, 2006; Bays & Wolpert, 
2007; Blakemore, et al., 1998). Revealing in this context is also the fact that the effect is 
usually called sensory suppression. 
However, Waszak, Cardodo-Leite and Hughes (2012) put forward a different scenario 
that can be directly derived from the ideomotor theory of action control (cf., Harless, 
1861; James, 1890; Lotze, 1852) and, extending it, the common coding principle (e.g. 
Prinz, 1997, Hommel et al., 2001). The common coding principle claims that perception 
and action share a common representational code: Actions are coded in terms of the 
distal perceptual effects they evoke in the environment. Consequently, perceiving an 
action effect involves the same representation as performing the associated action and, 
conversely, performing an action involves the same representation as perceiving the 
effect it is associated to effects. In other words, performing an action results in the 
internal pre-activation of the sensory representation of the action’s expected perceptual 
consequence. According to this scenario, internal action effect anticipation increases the 
mean level of activity in the network representing the expected effect to some pedestal 
level (see Figure 5, panel b). 
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Figure 5: Panel a) Illustration of the inhibition hypothesis where a correct prediction decreases the 
internal response of the signal (dark gray to gray distribution). Panel b) Illustration of the preactivation hypothesis 
where the internal response increases more for the noise distribution (black to light gray distribution) than for the 
Stimulus distribution (dark gray to gray distribution).  
 
In terms of the signal detection theory, under this latter account the sensitivity loss for 
congruent action effects is due to discrimination of the signal activation from the pedestal 
level being more difficult than discrimination of the signal activation from the baseline 
level (e.g., in the incongruent and the neutral conditions of the study of Cardoso-Leite et 
al. (2010), in which baseline activity in the neurons coding the action effect is not raised 
to pedestal levels). That is, according to the preactivation account, sensitivity in 
congruent trials is reduced because the mean of the pre-stimulus activity distribution is 
increased, not because the mean of the signal distribution is decreased.  
To formalize this notion, we considered the shape of the neural response to stimulus 
intensity (or relative contrast) to be non-linear and saturating (Ohzawa et al 1985, Dean 
1983, Albrecht et al 1984, Saul & Cynader, 1989a; see Figure 6). This response is 
usually fitted by the hyperbolic ratio function (Sclar et al., 1985; Heeger, 1992), 
, but in the current example we used a Weibull repartion 
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function, 
, such as to avoid making any specific hypotheses regarding 
the maximum firing rate of a neuron or a population. In Figure 6 the parameters λ and k 
were set to 10 and 1, respectively. In this function we considered  to be the neural entry 
and F(x) the associate neural response. Furthermore this function appears to be a good fit 
of the visual system’s response to stimulus contrast (Burr, Morrone, & Ross, 1994; 
Reynolds, Pasternak, & Desimone, 2000). Based on the idea that the neural firing rate is 
a function of the entry stimulation (McCulloch & Pitts, 1943) we used this function as an 
integrator of the sum of the entry stimulation where , with i being the 
activation source. There are three possible activation sources: Noise (n), Stimulus 
contrast (c) or Preactivation (p)). That is, the network is either activated by noise, internal 
preactivation and/or stimulus contrast.  
As the noise baseline response function we took a spontaneous internal response activity 
(internal noise) of about 1% such that =0.01. This noise 
baseline is represented by the x-axis in Figure 6. It reflects the network’s mean activity 
when internal noise is the only source of neural activation. However, when a stimulus is 
presented, the neurons can be activated due to noise and the stimulus. The corresponding 
function , thus, integrates stimulus activity and 
noise baseline activity (dashed function in Figure 6). It represents the system’s response 
to stimulus contrast without internal preactivation that is when it does not anticipate the 
stimulus represented by this particular set of neurons. In case of internal preactivation, 
, the baseline is raised to a pedestal level 
(dashed horizontal line in Figure 6). When a stimulus is presented in this situation, the 
neurons can be activated by noise, preactivation and the stimulus contrast. The 
corresponding neural response function  
integrates stimulus contrast activity, noise baseline, and preactivation (solid function in 
Figure 6). Note that the function is shifted upward resulting in stronger internal responses 
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for identical stimulus contrasts as well as faster saturation of the internal response (i.e., 
saturation at a lower contrast values). Note also that the increase in internal response 
from the “without preactivation” (dashed line in Figure 6) to the “with preactivation” 
function (solid line in Figure 6) decreases with increasing level of activity. That is, the 
higher the activity level, the smaller the increase in internal response due to preactivation.  
    
 
Figure 6 : Internal response as a function of contrast. Sensitivity is reflected in the distance between internal 
responses. C0: Weak stimulus contrast; dt1: Detection sensitivity when there is no preactivation; dt2: Detection 
sensitivity when there is preactivation for the same stimulus (C0). The difference between xc= 0 (baseline activity) and 
xc=C0 is smaller with than without preactivation (dt1<dt2) due to a smaller stimulus-driven increase of the internal 
response when there is preactivation than when there is not. C1: Strong stimulus contrast; dc1: Discrimination 
sensitivity between C0 and C1 when there is no preactivation; dc2: Discrimination sensitivity between C0 and C1 
when there is preactivation. The model predicts that, for any C0 and C1, discrimination is better without than with 
preactivation (dc1<dc2). 
 
 
As noted earlier, according to Signal Detection Theory (SDT) detection sensitivity, as 
studied by Cardoso-Leite et al. (2010), is represented by the difference between the 
baseline internal responses (in Figure 6 the x-axis line when there is no preactivation and 
the dotted horizontal line when there is preactivation) and the internal response evoked 
by the stimulus added to the baseline. As we can see in Figure 5b and 6 our model 
predicts this difference to be smaller when there is a preactivation in the network than 
when there is not. Hence our model predicts smaller sensitivity with than without 
preactivation due to a smaller stimulus-driven increase of the internal response when 
there is preactivation than when there is not (see detection sensitivities (dt) dt1 and dt2 
for a stimulus of the same contrast (C0) in Figure 6).  
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In addition to this predicted difference in detection sensitivity our model predicts that the 
discrimination performance between stimuli of two different contrasts should also be 
reduced in the presence of preactivation compared to without preactivation (see 
discrimination sensitivities (dc) dc1 and dc2 for two stimuli of different contrasts (C0 
and C1) in Figure 6). Furthermore, our model predicts that this reduced contrast 
discrimination for trials with preactivation should largely be driven by a change in the 
internal response of the weaker stimulus (stimulus C0 in Figure 6), since at higher 
contrast values (stimulus C1 in Figure 6), the difference between preactivation and no 
preactivation should be reduced or even abolished due to saturation. In contrast, 
cancellation accounts of sensory attenuation have been described such that “a 
cancellation mechanism that specifically affects self-generated input may nonetheless 
attenuate all self-generated input equally, irrespective of intensity” (Bays & Wolpert, 
2007, page 30 line 28). In such a scenario contrast discrimination should not be reduced, 
since the perceptual distance between the two stimuli should remain the same if 
cancellation affects stimuli of all intensity equally. In our model the reduced effect of 
preactivation on the internal response at high stimulus strength, allows us to make a quite 
different prediction. As described above, discrimination sensitivity should be reduced 
since preactivation will influence the low contrast stimuli more than the high contrast 
stimuli. These basic features of our model are supported by a number of previous 
findings. Firstly, neural saturation and the non-linearity of the neural response to 
intensity (Ohzawa et al 1985, Dean 1983, Albrecht et al 1984, Saul & Cynader, 1989a, 
Nieder & Miller 2003) suggest that a linear increase in intensity translates to a non linear 
log-like increase in neural response. As such, an incremental increase in stimulus 
intensity will result in smaller increases in the neural response as intensity increases. 
Secondly perception of intensities has been seen to follow a Weber-Fechner law 
(Dehaene 2003 for numerosity, Gorea & Sagi 2001 for contrast) meaning that a given 
increase in stimulus energy will affect perception more if the stimulus is weak. Taken 
together these findings provide strong support for the basis of our experimental 
prediction, namely that a fixed amount of stimulus preactivation will influence the 
internal response to a greater degree for low contrast than for high contrast stimuli.  
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 Experimental Part: Investigation of the preactivation Hypothesis 
We tested these predictions by asking participants to perform a contrast discrimination 
task for stimuli that were congruent (trials where the preactivation matches the stimulus) 
or incongruent (trials where the preactivation doesn’t match the stimulus) with previously 
learnt action effect associations. Participants performed left- or right-hand voluntary 
actions on each trial that had previously been associated with the letters A and H 
respectively. In the test phase these stimuli were presented at one of two contrast values 
(C0 or C1) and participants were required to report the perceived contrast at the end of 
each trial on a 100 point scale, where ratings of below 50 were classed as C0 and ratings 
above 50 as C1. According to our model, congruent trials should result in reduced 
contrast discrimination compared to incongruent trials, with this difference largely 
determined by changes in the internal response for the weaker stimulus.  
a Materials and Methods 
 Stimuli  
Experimental stimuli were generated and presented with Matlab 2007b using the 
psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997; Kleiner et al, 2007). The stimuli 
were two white letters (A and H) displayed on a 15 inches CRT monitor at a 60hz refresh 
rate and fitted into a virtual square of 2.9 degrees of visual angle. The screen resolution 
was set at 800*600 pixels. These two stimuli were presented at two different contrast 
values (C0 and C1; see contrast determination phase) at the center of the screen. In the 
test phase we used a uniform noise texture to increase perceptual variance. This noise 
was a 100*100 matrix filled with an equal number of white and black pixels. The matrix 
was re-sampled (using the randperm function in Matlab) on each screen refresh. The 
mean luminance of the noise was then equal to the gray background. 
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 Contrast determination phase.  
In order to determine individual contrast values C0 and C1 yielding a discrimination d’ 
of about 2, every participant completed a psychophysical staircase converging on 90% 
correct responses in a letter identification task (A vs. H). We employed an adaptive 
staircase to manipulate stimulus transparency using an accelerated stochastic 
approximation algorithm as described by Kesten (1958). The initial step size was 20 and 
we stopped the staircase when the step size was 1 (in transparency). The correct response 
rated was used to ensure that the stimuli were supraliminal and that we could then 
independently manipulate discrimination. We used this contrast value as the referential 
contrast C0 in a 2AFC paradigm (with constant stimuli ranging from C0 to C0+12%) in 
order to calculate, the contrast value of C1 yielding 85% correct responses in a luminance 
discrimination task (C0 vs. C1). For an ideal observer, this contrast yields a 
discrimination d’ of around 2 (Mcmillan & Creelman, 1991). Pilot experiments showed 
this procedure to work reliably.  
 Association phase. 
Participants fixated on a 3.3 degrees visual angle square located at the center of the 
screen. They were asked to press with their right/left index finger one of two keys (P and 
A on a standard French (AZERTY) keyboard), each key press triggering presentation of 
a visual effect (A or H). The key-letter mapping was counterbalanced across participants. 
The letters appeared 100ms after the key press at full contrast in the square at the center 
of the screen. 
 There were two types of association phase. First, in the free association 
(“FreeAsso”) blocks the action sequence (left / right) was freely generate by the 
participants at a pace of about 1 key press every seconds for 50 seconds. In 5% of the 
trials the visual effect was a W. In these catch trials, the participant had to press both 
buttons within 1s of the appearance of the stimulus. Catch trials were meant to ensure 
that participants paid attention to the effect stimuli. Second, in memory association 
blocks (“MemoryAsso”) random lists of As and Hs were presented to the participants 
(the average list size was 5). The lists were presented via headphones as spoken letters. 
After the lists were presented, participants had to reproduce the sequence by pressing the 
corresponding button sequence. 
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Figure 7: Representation of the “FreeAsso” association phase. 
 
The association phase consisted of three FreeAsso blocks and two MemoryAsso blocks. 
Each FreeAsso block contained 50 trials. Each MemoryAsso block contained 30 
sequences of, on average, 5 items.  Each Participant ran 3 FreeAsso and 2 MemoryAsso 
blocks. 
 Test Phase  
Participants fixated a square at the center of the screen, just as in the association phase. 
They were asked to produce, at random, right and left key presses. Again, the key presses 
triggered presentation of letter stimuli 100ms after the key press for a duration of 200ms. 
In this phase, however, Hs and As were presented randomly after each key press, such 
that 50% of the generated stimuli were congruent with the previous association (i.e., the 
letter corresponded to the one associated to that key press in the association phase), and 
50% were incongruent.  
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Figure 8: Test phase protocol representation 
 
The stimuli appeared randomly (but in equal proportions) with the luminance C0 or the 
luminance C1. Participants were told that there were two categories of luminance ranging 
from the value 0 to 50 for the C0 category and from 50 to 100 for the C1 category. In 
order to maintain this uncertainty about the contrast on 5% of the trial stimuli appeared 
with a random contrast between C0-15% contrast and C1+15% contrast. After the 
stimulus had disappeared participants were required to judge the luminance value of the 
stimulus on a luminance response bar. On this bar participants could place the cursor on 
the perceived contrast value (from 0 to 100 except 50) with values under 50 
corresponding to C0 and over 50 corresponding to C1. Participants completed 3 tests 
blocks of 44 trials before being in a re-association phase composed by one of each 
association blocks and ran 3 others tests blocks. In total participants responded to 264 
test trials. 
 Participants.  
Fifteen participants took part in the experiment. They were naive to the purpose of the 
experiment. Three of these fifteen participants were excluded from the analysis as their 
luminance discrimination d’s were almost 0 (mean d’=0.038 SEM=0.124). Six of the 
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remaining participants (7 women, 5 men; mean age = 24 years, SEM = 3.69 years) had 
action-effect mapping 1 (leftA, right  B), and six had mapping 2.  
 Analysis of discrimination performance 
The luminance discrimination task was considered to be a yes/no protocol, with C1 being 
the target. That is, a C1 response to a C1 stimulus is a hit, a C1 response to a C0 stimulus 
is a false alarm, etc. d’ and c are calculated using d′ = z(hit rate) − z(false alarm rate) and 
c = −0.5 × [z(hit rate)+ z(false alarm rate)])3. D’ and c were calculated separately for 
congruent and incongruent trials.   
b Results 
We first analyzed our data dependent on participants’ contrast discrimination, such that 
we divided our contrast rating into two classes of contrasts (corresponding to C0 and 
C1). Discrimination performance (d’) was lower in the congruent condition than in the 
incongruent condition (Congruent: M=1.82, SEM=0.54 Incongruent: M=1.98, 
SEM=0.59). A repeated measure one factor ANOVA with the factor of congruency 
showed this effect of congruency on d’ to be significant (F(1,11)=5.59, p=0.037).  At the 
same time, the criterion was not different in the two congruency conditions (Congruent: 
M=0.32, SEM=0.23 Incongruent: M=0.34, SEM=0.33; F(1,11)=0.15, p=0.69).  
     
We performed separate repeated measure ANOVAs for Side*Congruency (interaction: 
F(1,11)=0.99, p=0.33) and for Mapping group*Congruency (interaction: F(1,5)=0.064, 
p=0.81) what revealed the congruency effect to be identical for both response sides and 
for both mapping groups. Taken together, these finding supports the hypothesis that 
preactivation of predicted action-effects reduces discrimination sensitivity.   
Since participants provided their judgments of contrast using a continuous scale from 1 
to 100 this allowed us to analyze not only their overall contrast judgment (C0 or C1) but 
also their rating of the perceived intensity (contrast) of the stimulus. We used these 
ratings to compute ROC (receiver operating characteristic) curves for each participant. 
We calculated the Area under the curve (A’=1/2*Σ(Fi+1-Fi)(Hi+1+Hi)) separately for every 
participant and condition. A one tailed T-test revealed a near significant difference such 
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that incongruent trials were perceived as being of higher contrast that congruent trials 
(Congruent: M=0.871, SEM=0.05 Incongruent: M=0.88, SEM=0.06; t(11)=0.8866, 
p=0.0515). As we can see on Figure 9, the distribution of A’ tends to be in majority 
above the equality line (Cong = Incong).  This fits the distribution pattern of d’ (see 
figure 9).   
 
Figure 9 : Distribution of individual results for d’ and A’, above the diagonal Incongruent>Congruent. 
c Discussion 
We trained participants to acquire associations between left- and right-hand key presses 
and the visual presentation of the letters A and H, respectively. In a subsequent test 
phase, participants performed right- and left-hand key presses that triggered the 
presentation of either and H or an A. The letters appeared in one of two contrasts 
(C0/C1). The stimulus could either be congruent or incongruent with respect to the learnt 
action-effect contingency. We showed that luminance discrimination between the two 
contrasts yielded a smaller d’ for congruent action-letter combinations (i.e., when the 
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letter corresponded to the one associated to that key press in the association phase) than 
for incongruent combinations. Subsequent analysis of participants’ luminance ratings 
showed that this reduction in d’ was due to internal responses of C0 being increased for 
congruent compared to incongruent trials, while internal responses of C1 not being 
different for congruent and incongruent trials. This brings about that the internal 
responses of C0 and C1 are drawn together for congruent compared to incongruent trials, 
making the luminance discrimination more difficult in the former than in the latter type 
of trial. Note that this pattern of results corresponds to what the preactivation account 
outlined above predicts. The account predicts a reduced contrast discrimination 
performance for congruent compared to incongruent stimuli, because the stimulus-driven 
internal response gain is lower with than without preactivation. The stronger the stimulus 
the smaller the increase of the internal response due to the preactivation (i.e., with 
preactivation (congruent) compared to without preactivation (incongruent)).  
The presence of a shift of the internal response for C0 but not for C1 in our data confirms 
the model’s prediction. 
So, detection/discrimination is determined by the difference between Signal and Noise 
with and without preactivation ((Signal without – noise without) > (Signal with – noise 
with) in the case of detection, and by the difference between C1 and C0 with and without 
preactivation in case of discrimination (C1 without – C0 without) > (C1 with – C0 with). 
In a nutshell, detection/discrimination is worse because preactivation shifts the perceived 
contrast/rating more to the right for noise than signal (detection), and for C0 than C1 
(discrimination). 
In order to estimate the level of preactivation that would result in a difference in 
discrimination d’ between a situation without and a situation with preactivation as 
observed in our experiment, we attempted to use our model to recreate our observed 
results. We first fitted the exact discrimination d’ we observed in the incongruent 
condition with a Weibull function, using the contrast values from our experiment C0 
(36%) and C1 (51%). To be able to calculate d’ (Distance of the distributions/Variance of 
the distributions) we needed to estimate the variance of the internal response of a given 
contrast. Since the variance of the participants’ perceived contrast ratings did not differ 
between our conditions any variance satisfying the constraint of returning the exact 
experimental d’ could be chosen. Moreover, we constrained the function to minimize the 
differences in internal response to C1 across all possible preactivation levels. We found 
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that, with a Weibull repartition function having the parameters λ=14.8 and k=1 we were 
able to fit a 3% variance of the internal response to yield exactly to the observed d’ for 
incongruent trials (1.98).  The internal responses for C0 and C1 were 90.7% and 96.6%, 
respectively. This fits well the fact that our stimuli were highly supraliminal (see 
methods and materials).  
Using the function for the incongruent condition as a starting point, we estimated the 
level of preactivation necessary to yield a d’ reduction as observed in the experiment. We 
found that a preactivation activity of 8% was sufficient to reduce d’ from 1.98 in the 
incongruent condition to 1.82 in the congruent condition. The internal responses to C0 
and C1 in the latter condition were 91.4% and 96.9%. Hence, the internal response for C0 
increased much more (0.7%) than the internal response of C1 (0.3%), replicating what 
we observed in our experimental data.  
To further validate our model, we assessed whether the same amount of preactivation 
would explain the decrease in detection d’ observed by Cardoso-Leite et al. (2010). In a 
detection task sensitivity is represented by the distance between the mean baseline 
internal activity (‘noise’) and the mean internal activity driven by the stimulus (‘signal’ + 
‘noise’; see Figure 1 and Figure 2a). Cardoso et al. observed a reduction in detection d’ 
from the incongruent condition (2.55)
 
to the congruent condition (2.37). We modeled 
detection d’ as the difference in internal response between the baseline activity 
corresponding to 1% of internal activity due to noise and the internal response to a 
stimulus at threshold (9% of internal activity yielding a detection d’ of 2.55). We found 
that adding 8% of preactivation activity (as estimated above) made detection d’ drop to 
2.34. Hence, the same preactivation level of 8% could also explain the results from 
Cardoso-Leite et al. (2010). 
In this study we introduce a new preactivation-based model to account for the role of 
motor prediction in sensory attenuation. This model allowed us to derive novel 
hypotheses regarding participants contrast discrimination performance. We should note 
such preactivation induced sensory attention might not be limited to action prediction, 
but may also result from other non-motor prediction mechanisms (see Waszak et al., 
2012 for a discussion).  
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B. Study 2: Investigate the link between 
Neurophysiology and psychophysics 
This chapter is based on: Roussel , C., Hughes, G., & Waszak, F. Action 
prediction modulates both neurophysiological and psychophysical indices 
of sensory attenuation. [Under Review] 
It has been shown that self-generated stimuli are perceived as less intense than externally 
generated stimuli, a phenomenon known as sensory attenuation as outlined above. 
Sensory attenuation has been demonstrated in the somatosensory (Blakemore et al., 
1998), the auditory (Sato, 2008) and the visual domain (Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010; 
Roussel et al., 2013). Studies investigating sensory attenuation as a perceptual 
phenomenon have been complemented by studies investigating neurophysiological 
correlates of anticipated action effects (e.g., Aliu et al., 2009; Baess et al., 2008; 
Blakemore et al., 1998; Gentsch and Schütz-Bosbach, 2011; Hughes and Waszak, 2011; 
Hughes et al., 2013b; Schäfer and Marcus, 1973). To give an example, Baess et al. 
(2008) found a reduced auditory N1 component for action-triggered tones compared to 
externally triggered tones, suggesting that cortical activity was attenuated for the former.  
Both attenuated phenomenological and neurophysiological responses are usually 
interpreted along the same lines in terms of forward models introduced above (e.g., 
Wolpert and Miall, 1996), as if they reflect the same mechanism. At the same time, this 
mechanism has usually been considered to be relatively low-level (‘sensory’). However, 
a systematic investigation of the relationship between sensory attenuation as a perceptual 
phenomenon, on the one side, and as a neurophysiological phenomenon, on the other 
side, is missing. As a consequence, it is impossible to tell how the attenuation of 
perceptual awareness is related to the attenuation of cortical responses that have been 
observed a number of times in separate experiments. Moreover, concerning the locus of 
the effect, differences in cortical responses between conditions with and without effect 
anticipation cannot always be unequivocally attributed to sensory processing. Often they 
may also be caused by other differences in attentional and cognitive processing (cf., 
Waszak et al., 2012; Hughes et al., 2013a). As a consequence, different studies do not 
always converge to the same conclusions. For example, Baess et al. (2008) observed 
attenuated fronto-central negativity when comparing action-triggered vs. externally 
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triggered auditory stimuli. They concluded that early sensory processing in the auditory 
cortex is reduced. By contrast, Hughes and Waszak (2011) compared ERPs to action-
triggered vs. externally triggered visual stimuli. They observed an increased, not a 
decreased, visual P1 component. In this study, attenuated cortical responses were 
observed in a frontoparietal network, starting 150 ms after stimulus. This result would be 
in line with the findings of Del Cul et al. (2007) showing that subjective thresholds of 
visual stimuli is reflected in later processing in a fronto-parietal network, rather than in 
early visual areas.  
The aim of the current experiment was to shed new light on two interrelated questions. 
First, we investigated whether neurophysiological indices of sensory attenuation reflect 
early, low-level or later, higher-level mechanisms. Second, we explored how 
neurophysiological and perceptual indices of sensory attenuation relate. To do so, we 
adapted, using EEG, a luminance discrimination protocol that has been used before 
successfully to assess perceptual sensitivity and response bias of anticipated and 
unanticipated visual action effects (Roussel et al., 2013; see chapter II.A). Roussel et al. 
made participants learn an association between left and right key presses and the 
presentation of the letters A and H, respectively. They then made participants perform 
left and right key presses that randomly triggered presentation of either an H or and A at 
one of two possible contrasts. Participants were required to make discrimination 
judgments between the two contrasts. They showed contrast discrimination to be worse 
when the prediction (H or A, as learned during the association phase of the experiment) 
matches the true stimulus. Importantly, this paradigm does not only manipulate whether 
an action effect is predicted or not, but also the action effects’ physical energy (contrast, 
as we used visual stimuli). It, thus, allows us to test whether or not prediction influences 
the same early components in the EEG as physical stimulus energy. If this is the case, 
then the effect of prediction (sensory attenuation) is likely an early, low-level 
phenomenon. Moreover, assessing both psychophysical and neurophysiological measures 
of sensory attenuation enables us to tell how neurophysiological components and reduced 
awareness of the action effects interrelate.  
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 Experimental part: Action prediction modulates both neurophysiological 
and psychophysical indices of sensory attenuation 
a Materials and Methods 
 Stimuli. 
The stimuli were two white letters (A and H) presented within a virtual square of 3.3 
degrees of visual angle and displayed on a 24 inch LED monitor at a 60hz refresh. These 
two stimuli were presented at two different contrast values (C0 and C1, determined for 
each subject; see Contrast determination phase) at the center of the screen. In the test 
phase we used a uniform noise texture to increase perceptual variance. This noise texture 
was re-sampled on each screen refresh with always the same number of white and black 
pixels. The mean luminance of the noise was then equal to the gray background. 
 
 Contrast determination phase.  
In order to determine individual contrast values C0 and C1 yielding a discrimination d’ 
of about 1.5, every participant completed a psychophysical staircase converging on 90% 
correct responses in a letter identification task (A vs. H). This correct response rate was 
used to ensure that the stimuli were supraliminal and that we could then independently 
manipulate discrimination. We used the resulting contrast value as the referential contrast 
C0 in a 2AFC paradigm (with constant stimuli ranging from C0 to C0+12%) in order to 
calculate the contrast value of C1 yielding 80% correct responses in a luminance 
discrimination task (C0 vs. C1). For an ideal observer, this contrast yields a 
discrimination d’ of around 1.5 (Mcmillan & Creelman, 1991). 
 Association phase. 
Participants fixated on a 3.3 degrees visual angle square located at the center of the 
screen. They were asked to press with their right/left index finger one of two keys (right 
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and left on a response pad), each key press triggering presentation of a visual effect (A or 
H). The key-letter mapping was counterbalanced across participants. The letters appeared 
200ms after the key press at full contrast in the square at the center of the screen. 
 There were two types of association phase. First, in the free association 
(“FreeAsso”) blocks the action sequence (left / right) was freely generate by the 
participants at a pace of about 1 key press every second for 50 seconds. In 5% of the 
trials the visual effect was a W. In these catch trials, the participant had to press both 
buttons within 1s of the appearance of the stimulus. Catch trials were meant to ensure 
that participants paid attention to the effect stimuli. Second, in memory association 
blocks (“MemoryAsso”), random lists of As and Hs were presented to the participants 
(the average list size was 5). The lists were presented via headphones as spoken letters. 
After the lists were presented, participants had to reproduce the sequence by pressing the 
corresponding button sequence. 
The association phase consisted of three FreeAsso blocks and two MemoryAsso blocks. 
Each FreeAsso block contained 50 trials. Each MemoryAsso block contained 30 
sequences of, on average, 5 items. Each Participant ran 3 FreeAsso and 2 MemoryAsso 
blocks. 
 Test Phase.  
Participants fixated a square at the center of the screen, just as in the association phase. 
They were asked to produce, at random, right and left key presses. Again, the key presses 
triggered presentation of letter stimuli 200ms after the key press. In this phase, however, 
Hs and As were presented randomly after each key press, such that 47.5% of the 
generated stimuli were congruent with the previous association (i.e., the letter 
corresponded to the one associated to that key press in the association phase), and 47.5% 
were incongruent. On the remaining 5% of trials, no stimulus was presented. The stimuli 
appeared randomly (but in equal proportions) with the luminance C0 or the luminance 
C1. Participants were told that there were two categories of luminance ranging from the 
value 0 to 49 for the C0 category and from 51 to 100 for the C1 category. In order to 
maintain this uncertainty about the contrast on 5% of trials stimuli appeared with a 
random contrast between C0-15% contrast and C1+15% contrast. After the stimulus had 
disappeared participants were required to judge the luminance value of the stimulus on a 
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luminance response bar. On this bar participants could place the cursor on the perceived 
contrast value with values of 49 and under corresponding to C0 and 51 and over 
corresponding to C1. Participants completed 3 tests blocks of 44 trials before being in a 
re-association phase composed by one of each association blocks and ran 3 others tests 
blocks. In total participants responded to 264 test trials. 
 
 
 Analysis of discrimination performance 
The luminance discrimination task was considered to be a yes/no protocol, with C1 being 
the target. That is, a C1 response to a C1 stimulus is a hit, a C1 response to a C0 stimulus 
is a false alarm, etc. d’ and c are calculated using d′ = z(hit rate) − z(false alarm rate) and 
c = −0.5 × [z(hit rate)+ z(false alarm rate)])1. D’ and c were calculated separately for 
congruent and incongruent trials.   
 
 EEG recording and data preprocessing. 
EEG was recorded with 64 electrodes (actiCAP, Brain ProductsGmbH, Germany). The 
EEG was digitized at 500 Hz. EEG analysis was conducted using EEGLAB (Delorme & 
Makeig, 2004) and custom-built Matlab scripts. The data were resampled offline to a 250 
Hz sample rate, with a notch filter from 45 to 55 Hz to remove line noise. Epochs were 
generated from -500 to 980 ms relative to stimulus onset, with a 200 ms prestimulus 
baseline correction. Initial artifact rejection was conducted in a semiautomatic manner (in 
EEGLAB) by rejecting epochs with activity above 100 μV or below -100 μV, as well as 
rejecting trials where activity at any time point for any electrode was more than 5 
standard deviations from the mean activity for that epoch. Any channels that contributed 
to the rejection of many epochs were considered for removal and later interpolation. 
Frontal channels that showed large amplitude blink activity were also excluded from this 
first pass of semiautomatic artifact rejection. Ocular artifact correction was conducted in 
EEGLAB in Matlab using independent component analysis (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). 
Following removal of eye blinks and eye movements, noisy channels were replaced by 
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an interpolated weighted average from surrounding electrodes. Data were then re-
referenced to the common average. A final round of semiautomatic artifact rejection with 
a threshold of +/- 80 μV was used to remove any remaining artifacts. All ERPs are 
presented with a low-pass filter of 20 Hz for visual presentation purposes.  
 
EEG analysis was on averaged ERPs for each participant using ANOVA with the factors 
congruency (congruent, incongruent) and stimulus contrast (C0, C1). Since our task 
involved visual stimuli, we focused our analysis of a region of interest on the occipital 
electrodes (O1 Oz O2). Since our stimuli were degraded and presented in a continuous 
stream of background visual noise, we postulated that this might influence the latency of 
the visual response. Therefore we inspected the ERPs over our region of interest to 
determine the time window corresponding to an apparent peak for the visual stimulus that 
would also be modulated by the contrast of the stimulus (C0 vs C1).  
 Participants. 
Nineteen participants took part in the experiment. They were naive to the purpose of the 
experiment. Four of these nineteen participants were excluded from the analysis as their 
luminance discrimination d’s were below 0.5 (for 2 of them) or because the ratio of right 
left key presses during the test phases exceeded a 75% 35% ratio (for one of them). One 
was rejected because of the poor quality of the EEG recordings. Seven of the remaining 
participants had action-effect mapping 1 (leftA, right  H), and height had mapping 2 
(8 women, 7 men; mean age = 24 years, SEM = 3.69 years).  
 
b Results  
In order to ensure that the data were equivalent between the EEG and the behavioral 
analysis only trials free from EEG artifacts and trials that were not classified as outliers 
in the behavioral data were analyzed. The amount of rejected data was less than 10% of 
the total number of trials. 
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 Psychophysical Results 
We analyzed our data dependent on participants’ contrast discrimination. Discrimination 
performance (d’) was lower in the congruent condition (d’ congruent: 1.22) than in the 
incongruent (d’ incongruent: 1.42) condition (see Table 1). A repeated measure analysis 
of variance including the factor of congruency showed this effect of congruency on d’ to 
be significant (F(1,14)=5.36, p=0.03). At the same time, the criterion was not different in 
the two congruency conditions (see Table 1; F(1,14) = 0.165, p = 0.69). An unbiased 
measure of A’ also confirms our finding. Sensitivity appears to be better for incongruent 
trials (A’: 0.81) than for congruent trials (A’: 0.79) (F(1,14) = 4.670, p =0.04) (see figure 
11).   
   
Figure 10: ROC curves for congruent and incongruent trials. 
 EEG Results 
In this section we focus on the effect of motor prediction on the neurophysiological 
indices of visual processing to determine the degree to which behavioral and neural 
sensory attenuation are related. The ERPs and the topographies for the different 
conditions are presented in Figures 2 and 3. A large negative deflection is apparent in all 
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the waveforms, peaking at around 250 ms after stimulus onset.  This peak appears to be 
greater for C1 than C0, such that it likely reflects processing of the visual stimulus (a 
delayed visual N1 component). To quantify these effects we took the average amplitude 
of each condition in a 140ms time window centered on this peak (180 ms to 320 ms). 
This analysis revealed a significant main effect of Contrast (F(1,14) = 6.56 p = 0.011), 
confirming significantly greater amplitude for C1 (mean = -1.67; std = 1.55) compared to 
C0 (mean = -0.81; std = 1.8). The topography of this difference is consistent with 
modulation of an occipital ERP component. 
 
Figure 11: Contrast effect: ERP & Topography, This figure presents the mean ERPs on O1 Oz O2 for C0 (in blue) 
and C1 (in red) from -500 to 980ms relative to stimulus apparition. The blued surface represents the analysis time 
window (from 180 to 320ms, centered on the pic around 250ms). In the top left corner the topography of the difference 
(C1-C0) is presented for the analysis time window. 
In line with the aim of the current experiment, it was important to determine whether we 
observed significant attenuation of this visual ERP peak as a function of congruent motor 
prediction.  We observed a significant main effect of Congruency (F(1,14)=6.93 p= 
0.009), such that our visual component was of significantly smaller amplitude in the 
congruent condition (mean = -0.99; std = 1.57), compared to the incongruent condition 
(mean = -1.50; std = 1.64). The topography of this difference is also consistent with a 
 48 
 
modulation of visual processing as a function of action prediction. Since we also 
observed attenuated sensitivity for congruent trials in the behavioral analysis presented 
above, this provides evidence that neural and behavioral measures of sensory attenuation 
are likely related.   
 
Figure 12: Congruency effect: ERP & Topography This figure presents the mean ERPs on O1 Oz O2 for 
congruent (in blue) and incongruent (in red) from -500 to 980ms relative to stimulus apparition. The blued surface 
represents the analysis time window (from 180 to 320ms, centered on the pic around 250ms). In the top left corner the 
topography of the difference (Incongruent – Congruent) is presented for the analysis time window. 
c Discussion 
First of all, our experiment shows that neurophysiological sensory attenuation is a 
phenomenon that is not restricted to the auditory and somatosensory modality, but that it 
can also be observed in the visual domain.  More importantly, one of the aims of the 
experiment presented above was to investigate the locus of sensory attenuation. This was 
done by way of comparing the influence of prediction and stimulus contrast, respectively, 
on the ERPs triggered by visual action effects. We observed that an N1 component was 
clearly modulated by stimulus contrast, with larger contrasts resulting in a larger 
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deflection. Importantly, congruency affected the very same component, with congruent 
trials resulting in smaller amplitudes than incongruent trials.  
Of course, our data cannot show which processing stage precisely the two factors 
manipulated in the current experiment influence. The current paradigm differs in 
important aspects from other studies investigating visual evoked potentials. Notably, we 
presented stimuli in visual noise resampled at each screen refresh. The actions’ effects 
were, therefore, not presented with a sharp onset. Moreover, in our experiment, stimuli 
were triggered by an action. It is therefore difficult to compare our results to ERPs found 
in previous studies. However, previous research seems to suggest that contrast-dependent 
processes take place rather early in the visual processing stream (e.g., Schadow et al., 
2007), while later components are rather modulated by motion and form perception 
(Bach & Ullrich, 1997; Göpfert et al., 1998). Importantly, our experiment allowed us to 
directly compare the effect of contrast and prediction. As it demonstrates that motor 
prediction influences the same processing stage as visual contrast, we assume that motor 
prediction as manipulated in our experiment influences an early processing stage that is 
otherwise still modulated by basic stimulus-features. This interpretation is corroborated 
by the fact that the N1 component in question has an occipital topography. That this 
component has a relatively late latency is probably due to the fact that the stimuli used in 
the current experiment were not presented with a sharp onset, but embedded in dynamic 
pixel noise, such that the detection of a pattern is more time-consuming.  
 The second aim of the present study was to explore how neurophysiological and 
perceptual indices of sensory attenuation relate. We used a luminance discrimination 
protocol to assess perceptual sensitivity and response bias of anticipated and 
unanticipated visual action effects, assessing EEG activity at the same time. The 
psychophysical results show that discrimination performance (d’, A’) was better in the 
incongruent condition than in the congruent condition. At the same time, the criterion 
was not different in the two congruency conditions. The results, thus, are in line with the 
findings of Roussel et al. (2013) and Cardoso-Leite et al. (2010). They show that contrast 
sensitivity is reduced when a motor act provides an accurate prediction of the ensuing 
visual stimulus.  
 As concerns the effect of congruency on ERPs, we observed that the contrast-
sensitive visual component was significantly smaller in the congruent condition 
compared to the incongruent condition. We, thus, observed, to our knowledge for the first 
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time, sensory attenuation in psychophysical and neurophysiological indices at the same 
time, suggesting that the two measures of sensory attenuation are likely related. 
However, note that the psychophysical effect corresponds to an interaction between 
contrast and congruency: The discrimination between the two contrast levels is more 
difficult in congruent than in incongruent trials. If sensory attenuation assessed with 
psychophysical methods were a direct reflection of the ERPs assessed at the same time, 
we would have expected to see an interaction between these two factors in our ERP data 
as well. However, this was not the case. Of course, it might be that the ERP data simply 
lack sufficient statistical power. However, it is also possible that psychophysical and 
ERP indices of sensory attenuation (at least those assessed in the current experiment) are 
not in a simple one-to-one relationship (See Appendix 2 for an ERP figure of the 2x2 
design). Perception might be dependent not only on early cortical responses, but also on 
later processing and/or recurrent processing, tweaking the relationship between 
perceptual measures and observable neurophysiological measures. 
In conclusion, in our experiment ERP effects of visual sensory attenuation were found to 
correspond to contrast-dependent processing stages. We conclude that motor prediction, 
thus, influences quite early processes in the sensory treatment. Moreover, we 
demonstrated that both psychophysical and ERP indices of sensory attenuation can be 
observed in the visual modality. However, the exact relationship between the two types 
of measure needs to be further clarified, as there are not only commonalities, but also 
differences.   
C. Study 3: Two dimensional extension of the 
preactivation principle 
It has been shown in the present work (Roussel et al. 2013; see chapter II.A) that contrast 
discrimination is altered when a stimulus was predicted by a keypress.  The model 
outlined above suggests that we should call this effect sensitivity attenuation, rather than 
sensory attenuation, since this term better expresses the idea of a decrease in the ability to 
discriminate intensities. The model is based on the assumption of a non linear increase of 
the internal response to contrast due to preactivation. Thus, according to the preactivation 
theory the prediction of the action’s consequence increases the internal response 
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distribution as a function of stimulus intensity, the more intense the stimulus, the less the 
increase of activity due to pre-activation.  
However, note that sensitivity attenuation is due to the relative change of the signal and 
the noise distribution (or of two different contrast distributions); the absolute activity 
level of the signal(s) actually increases. Importantly, if the absolute internal response to a 
stimulus increases with preactivation, then preactivation should result in perceptual 
facilitation (not attenuation) when the signal has to be identified (instead of detected in 
noise/ discriminated from another contrast stimulus). This perceptual facilitation would 
be based on the fact that a preactivated neural population is more easily differentiated 
from others neural populations. To capture this notion, we extended the preactivation 
model to comprise a two dimensional decision space. This extension is outlined in the 
following.   
According to signal detection theory, the distribution of the internal response represents 
the activity of a given neural population along one stimulus dimension. That is, this 
distribution represents the activity of one neural population coding for a particular 
stimulus (see Figure 14). To represent two different neural populations coding for two 
different stimuli, the formal representation needs to be extended to two dimensions 
(Macmillan & Creelman, 1991; see Figure 14). In this framework, an identification task 
is based on the comparison of the activity in two different neural populations (instead of 
one neural population as in the case of detection/ contrast discrimination). As a 
consequence, in the case of identification the preactivation model predicts a rather 
different result compared to detection/discrimination tasks (see Figure 14). 
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Figure 13: Schematic representation of the pre-activation model of action-effect anticipation.  Panel (a) 
and (b) represent detection d’ for stimuli that are predicted (congruent stimuli) compared to stimuli that are 
not predicted (incongruent stimuli). a-b) Lower d’ for congruent vs. incongruent stimuli would result from 
the fact that discrimination of the signal activation from the pedestal level is more difficult than 
discrimination of the signal activation from the baseline level (i.e., in the incongruent condition without 
effect anticipation, in which baseline activity is not raised to pedestal levels). Importantly, note that 
according to Roussel et al., (2013) action-effect pre-activation would not only increase the baseline activity 
but also, although to a lower degree, the Signal distribution (i.e. Signals 1 in Figure 13a and Signal 2 in 
Figure 13b). c-d) Consequently, due to this increase in Signal 1 and Signal 2 distribution when these 
signals are preactivated (Figure 13d), the perceptual distance between S1 and S2 would increase, thus 
enhancing identification d’ for congruent vs. incongruent stimuli (Figure 13d vs. Figure 13c). 
 
Note that in a two dimensional space, too, the sensitivity is still given by the distance 
between the internal response distributions. However, detection d’ and identification d’ 
rely on different comparisons (see Figure 13). Since preactivation is specific to the 
predicted stimulus, it affects only one dimension. Hence, the increases in the internal 
response for the predicted stimulus results in the   increase of the distance between the 
internal response distributions of the two stimuli that have to be identified (see Figure 
13). Hence while the preactivation hypothesis predicts sensitivity loss in detection and 
contrast discrimination tasks (with congruent trials being worse than incongruent trials), 
it predicts an improvement of identification performance (with congruent trials being 
better than incongruent trials).  
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By assessing the identification performance after acquisition of action effect-
relationships, we aimed to test this prediction of the preactivation hypothesis. 
 Experimental part: Sensitivity facilitation in an identification task 
a Method 
 Stimuli. 
Experimental stimuli were generated and presented with Matlab 2007b using the 
psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997; Kleiner et al, 2007). The stimuli 
were two tilted Gabor gratings (45° left, 45° right) displayed on a 15 inches CRT monitor 
at a 80hz refresh rate and fitted into a virtual square of 2.9 degrees of visual angle. The 
screen resolution was set at 800*600 pixels. These two stimuli were presented at a single 
contrast value (C0; see contrast determination phase) at the center of the screen 
consequently to a key press. We used in all our phases a uniform noise texture to increase 
perceptual variance. This noise was a 100*100 matrix filled with an equal number of 
white and black pixels. The matrix was re-sampled (using the randperm function in 
Matlab) on each screen refresh. The mean luminance of the noise was then equal to the 
gray background. 
 
 Contrast determination phase.  
In order to determine an individual contrast values C0 yielding an identification d’ of 
about 2 (between 2 orientations), every participant completed a psychophysical staircase 
converging on 85% correct responses in an orientation identification phase (rightward 
versus leftward tilt). We employed an adaptive staircase to manipulate stimulus 
transparency using an accelerated stochastic approximation algorithm as described by 
Kesten (1958). The initial step size was 20 and we stopped the staircase when the step 
size was 1 (in transparency). This correct response rate was used to ensure that the 
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stimuli were supraliminal and that we could then independently manipulate identification 
with associated action effects. We used the resulting contrast value as the individual 
contrast value C0. 
 Association phase. 
Participants fixated on a 3.3 degrees visual angle square located at the center of the 
screen. They were asked to press with their right/left index finger one of two keys (right 
and left on a response pad), each key press triggering presentation of a visual effect 
(leftward or rightward tilted Gabor grating). The key Gabor grating mapping was 
counterbalanced across participants. The gratings appeared 200ms after the key press at 
full contrast in the square at the center of the screen. 
 In the association phase the action sequence (left / right) was freely generated by the 
participants at a pace of about 1 key press every second for 100 trials. In 5% of the trials 
the visual effect was a yellow grating. In these catch trials, the participant had to press 
both buttons within 1s of the appearance of the stimulus. Catch trials were meant to 
ensure that participants paid attention to the effect stimuli.  
The association phase consisted of ten association blocks. 
 Test Phase.  
Participants fixated a square at the center of the screen, just as in the association phase. 
They were asked to produce, at random, right and left key presses. Again, the key presses 
triggered presentation of Gabor grating 200ms after the key press. In this phase, however, 
rightward and leftward tilted gratings were presented randomly after each key press, such 
that 50% of the generated stimuli were congruent with the previous association (i.e., the 
letter corresponded to the one associated to that key press in the association phase), and 
50% were incongruent. After the stimulus had disappeared participants were required to 
judge the orientation of the stimulus. Participants completed 10 tests blocks of 20 trials 
interleaved with the 10 association blocks. 
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 Analysis of identification performance 
The Identification task was considered to be a yes/no protocol, with right being the 
target. That is, a right response to a right stimulus is a hit, a right response to a left 
stimulus is a false alarm, etc. d’ and c are calculated using d′ = z(hit rate) − z(false alarm 
rate) and c = −0.5 × [z(hit rate)+ z(false alarm rate)])1. D’ and c were calculated 
separately for congruent and incongruent trials.   
b Results 
The results were analyzed for the 10 participants who passed the experiment. 
We first analyzed our data dependent on participants’ orientation identification. 
Identification performance (d’) was lower in the incongruent condition than in the 
congruent condition (Incongruent: M= 1.5, SEM=0.75; Congruent: M=2.12, SEM=0.6). 
A repeated measure one factor ANOVA with the factor of congruency showed this effect 
of congruency on d’ to be significant (F(1,9)= 11.8, p=0.008 ).  At the same time, the 
criterion was not different in the two congruency conditions (Congruent: M=-0.13, 
SEM=0.28; Incongruent: M=-0.025, SEM=0.18 ; F(1,9)=1.8 , p=0.2 ).    
However in this protocol it was possible that participants, in case of uncertainty, have 
indicated that the orientation of the grating that was congruent to the action they 
executed.  
To test for this bias we computed c for trials in which participants executed the action 
that in the previous association phase triggered the rightward tilted grating (defined to be 
the “signal”), i.e., right key-press for half of the subjects and left key-press for the rest of 
the subjects. We did the same for the trials in which participants executed the action that 
was associated with the leftward tilted grating (defined to be “noise”). We reasoned that 
if participants were biased in responding that the dots moved in the direction that was 
congruent to the action they executed, they should have been liberal (negative c) when 
they executed the action associated with the rightward tilted grating and conservative 
(positive c) when they executed the action associated with the leftward tilted grating. Our 
analysis showed that for the left tilted grating the criterion did not different from 0 ( 
mean : -0.01; F(1,9)=0.036 ,p=0.85 ; no bias), but the right tilted grating criterion 
appeared to be significantly different from 0 (mean=-0.12; F(1,9)=5.401 ,p=0.0452). 
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c Discussion 
In the current experiment we aimed to investigate identification performances in case of 
motor induced outcome prediction. Participants first associated right and left key presses 
with rightward and leftward tilted Gabor gratings. In the test phase participants had to 
freely produce a keypress followed randomly by one of the two gratings presented at 
identification threshold. They then had to indicate the stimulus orientation. The stimulus 
could either be congruent or incongruent with the learnt action-effect association.. We 
observed that identification d’ was higher for congruent trials than for incongruent trials. 
However, the method we used was not bias free, as we varied the stimulus dimension 
along the response dimension. Indeed, further analysis assessing the response bias 
showed that for one stimulus orientation the criterion was different from 0.  
This effect on the criterion thus raises the question as to the origin of our effect, as it 
renders the interpretation of the d’ effect difficult. However we would like to argue that if 
the results were mostly driven by a response strategy then both criteria should be 
different from 0.  Hence, the asymmetry in our results suggests that our effect was at 
least partly driven by sensory processes and not uniquely by response bias. 
D. Study 4: A closer look on the dynamics of 
preactivation 
This chapter is based on: Desantis, A., Roussel , C. & Waszak, F. The 
temporal dynamics of the perceptual consequences of action -effect 
prediction.  [Under Review] 
To recapitulate: The ideomotor theory claims that performing an action results in a 
bidirectional association between the action’s motor code and the sensory effects the 
action produces. Once acquired, these associations can be used to select an action by 
anticipating or internally activating their perceptual consequences (e.g., Elsner & 
Hommel, 2001; Herwig, Prinz, & Waszak, 2007; Prinz, 1997). This notion has been 
recently formulated in terms of a neural pre-activation, according to which action 
preparation/execution results in the activation of the sensory network that represent the 
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sensory action effect (see Kuhn et al., 2010; Waszak, Cardoso-Leite, & Hughes, 2012; 
Roussel, Hughes & Waszak, 2013; SanMiguel et al., 2013). 
The ideomotor principle has been corroborated by a number of studies (see Hommel, 
Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007; Shin et al., 
2010; Waszak et al., 2012; see Chapter I.F). However, it remains unclear when action-
effect prediction is generated by the brain. The question of whether it is related to 
preparatory stages of motor processing or rather to the execution of the action is 
essential, as it differentiates between a strong and a weak version of the ideomotor theory 
(cf. Ziessler & Nattkemper, 2011). A strong version assumes that effect anticipation is an 
integral part of action selection (e.g., James, 1950; Prinz, 1997). Effect anticipation 
should therefore necessarily take place at early stages of motor preparation. However, if 
effect anticipation is rather used for quality control and error handling, it could occur at 
later stages of motor preparation or after action execution.  
The present study investigates the temporal dynamics of action-effect anticipation (see 
also Bays, Wolpert, & Flanagan, 2005; Ziessler & Nattkemper, 2011) by assessing the 
perception of predicted and unpredicted action effects. Participants completed an 
acquisition phase during which specific actions (left and right key-presses) were 
associated with specific visual effects (dots moving upward or downward). In the test 
phase they completed a 2 AFC identification task in which they were required to indicate 
whether the dots moved upward or downward. To isolate any effects of action-effect 
prediction, participants were presented with congruent and incongruent dot motion in 
which the association they learned in the previous acquisition phase was respected or 
violated, respectively. Crucially, to assess the temporal dynamics of action prediction, 
congruent and incongruent stimuli were presented at different time points not only after 
but also before action execution.  
We observed higher sensitivity (d’) to motion discrimination in congruent vs. 
incongruent trials only when stimuli were presented from about 220ms before the action 
to 280ms after the action. The temporal dynamics of our effect suggests that the 
perceptual modulation of action-effect prediction occurs during motor preparation. As we 
will discuss below, our results corroborate the predictions of the pre-activation model 
concerning the influence of action-effect anticipation on identification d’.  
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  Experimental part :  Temporal investigation of action-effect prediction 
a Materials and Methods 
 Materials.  
Stimulus presentation and data acquisition were conducted using the psychophysics 
Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) for Matlab 7.5.0 running on a PC computer 
connected to a 19-in. 85 Hz CRT monitor. Auditory stimuli were presented via a pair of 
headphones. 
 
 Participants.  
Sixteen volunteers (average age = 26.34 years, SD = 5.42 years) participated in the 
experiment for an allowance of € 10/h. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
hearing and were naïve as to the hypothesis under investigation. They all gave written 
informed consent.  
Participants completed 40 acquisition and 40 test phases presented in an ABAB order. 
 Acquisition phases.  
The aim of the acquisition phases was to build action-effect associations. Participants 
were presented with a Random Dot Kinematogram (RDK) in which 100 dots (dots size: 
0.107deg) were displayed within a circular aperture of 7deg of diameter. They executed 
left or right key-presses in a random order and about equally often. Feedback of the 
proportion of right and left key-presses was provided every 20 trials. Participants’ actions 
generated a coherent dot motion: 90% of the dots moved either upward or downward 
during 100ms. For half of the participants the left key-press triggered an upward dot 
motion and the right key-press generated a downward motion. For the other half of the 
participants the reversed mapping was used. In 10% of the trials, after participants’ 
actions, the dots moved obliquely either downward or upward. In these trials participants 
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were required to immediately press the space bar. Each acquisition phase consisted of 60 
trials except for the first acquisition phase (100 trials), for a total of 2440 trials. 
 
 Test phases.  
As for the acquisition phases, in the test phases participants were presented with a RDK. 
They executed random left and right key-presses and about equally often. Feedback of 
the proportion of right and left key-presses was provided every 5 trials. Contrary to the 
acquisition phase, they were asked to execute left/right actions at about one second after 
a go signal (a 700Hz sinusoidal tone, 100ms of duration, presented at 70dB). Only the 
trials in which participants performed an action within 900ms and 1300ms after the go 
signal were considered as “correct” trials and analyzed. The rest of the trials were 
replaced with new trials until a minimum of 40 trials per condition was reached. 
Coherent dot motion (upward/downward motion) was delivered at different Stimulus 
Onset Asynchrony (SOA), i.e., 400, 600, 800, 1000 or 1200ms after the go signal. 
Consequently, the dots moved coherently before or after action execution. The coherent 
dot motion lasted 100ms. Thereafter, the dots moved randomly. In addition, the 
percentage of dots moving coherently was individually determined for each SOA and 
each participant in a preliminary experiment to produce a discrimination threshold of 
75% of correct responses.  
Dot motion direction was either congruent or incongruent with respect to the action-
effect association participants learnt in the previous acquisition phase. On congruent 
trials, participants’ key-press was preceded/followed by the dot motion direction that was 
associated with that same key-press in the acquisition phase. On incongruent trials, their 
action was preceded/followed by the dot motion direction that was associated with the 
other hand in the acquisition phase. At the end of each trial participants indicated whether 
the dots were moving upward or downward (Figure 14).  
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Figure 14 a) Illustration of the factorial design. Participants’ executed a left/right key-press at about 1 
second after a go signal (pure tone). They were presented with congruent or incongruent trials in which the 
action-effect association participants learnt in the acquisition phase was respected or violated, respectively. 
Congruent/ incongruent motion was presented at different interval before or after the action. b) Illustration 
of a trial from the test phase. At the end of each trial, participants were required to indicate whether the 
dots moved upward or downward. The percentage of dots moving upward/downward was individually 
determined for each SOA in a preliminary experiment to produce a discrimination threshold of 75% of 
correct responses.  
 
Each test phase consisted of 10 trials for a total of 400 trials (40 x 5 SOAs x 2 
Congruency conditions). 
b Results 
To assess the temporal dynamics of action-effect anticipation, we firstly divided the 
stimulus-before-action trials into four time intervals: bin1, from -880ms to -661ms; bin2, 
from -660ms to -441ms; bin3, form -440ms to -221ms; bin4, from -220ms to -1ms. The 
stimulus-after-action trials formed one bin: bin5, from 0ms to 280ms. Then, we 
computed participants’ sensitivity to motion discrimination (upward vs. downward) for 
the 2 Congruency conditions (congruent and incongruent) and the 5 Intervals.   
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We conducted a repeated measure of variance (ANOVA) on d’ values with Congruency 
(congruent and incongruent) and Intervals (bins 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5) as factors. The analysis 
showed no main effect of Congruency: F(1, 16) = .2459, p = .6266. Similarly, no main 
effect of Intervals was observed: F(4, 64) = .8469, p = .5007. However, the interaction 
was significant: F(4, 64) = 2.9282, p = .0274. Further two-tailed paired t-tests showed 
higher d’ in congruent vs. incongruent trials for the bin4 (-220ms : -1ms) and the 
stimulus-after-action trials (0ms : 280ms), t(15) = 2.8093, p = .0132 and t(15) = 3.0098, p 
= .0087, respectively. We did not find any differences between congruent and 
incongruent trials for the other three before-action intervals: t(15) = -0.8361, p = .4161 
(bin1, -880ms : -661ms), t(15) = -1.1432, p = .2708 (bin2, -660ms : -441ms), t(15) = -
0.6252, p = .5411 (bin3, -440ms : -221ms;). In summary, participants showed better 
discrimination in the congruent vs. the incongruent trials when stimuli where displayed 
from 220ms before the action to 280ms after the action (for an illustration of the temporal 
dynamics of action-effect prediction see Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 15: The ordinate axis shows participants’ running mean sensitivity (d’) to motion discrimination for 
congruent and incongruent trials. The abscissa shows the mean Interval at which the dots moved upward/downward 
with respect to participants’ action execution. The running means were computed as follows: for each participant, we 
started with about 40 trials (20% of the total number of trials per condition) having the longest negative SOA (the 
leftmost interval in the figure). We then discarded the 5% of trials having the longest SOAs within this bin of 40 trials 
and added the 5% of trials having the next shorter SOA; and so on until the bin included the  40 trials longest positive 
SOAs (the rightmost interval in the figure). The graphic shows that around 230ms participants’ sensitivity for 
congruent stimuli increase compared to sensitivity for incongruent stimuli. Bars represent standard error. 
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To check whether the increase in d′ was truly a sensitivity change we computed 
participants’ response criterion c = −0.5 × [z(hit rate) + z(false alarm rate)]). In 
particular, in order to rule out the possibility that participants, in case of uncertainty, 
might have indicated that the dots moved in the way that was congruent to the action they 
executed we run the following analysis. We computed c for the trials in which 
participants executed the action that in the previous association phase triggered the 
upward motion (defined to be the “signal”), i.e., right key-press for half of the subjects 
and left key-press for the rest of the subjects. We did the same for the trials in which 
participants executed the action that was associated with downward motion (defined to 
be “noise”). We reasoned that if participants were biased in responding that the dots 
moved in the direction that was congruent to the action they executed, they should have 
been liberal (negative c) when they executed the action associated with the upward 
motion (action-signal trials) and conservative (positive c)when they executed the action 
associated with the downward motion (action-noise trials). Our analysis showed that c 
did not different from 0 (no bias) for the 5 intervals for both the action-signal and the 
action-noise trials, confirming that the increase in d’ for congruent trials was truly due to 
a sensitivity change. 
c Discussion 
The current experiment sought to elucidate the dynamics of action effect anticipation by 
tracing the time course of its perceptual consequences. Participants learned that specific 
actions were associated with specific visual effects (upward and downward dots motion 
direction). They then performed a 2 AFC identification task in which they were required 
to indicate whether the dots moved upward or downward. Participants were presented 
with congruent and incongruent dot motion in which the association they learned in the 
previous acquisition phase was respected or violated, respectively. Crucially, congruent 
and incongruent stimuli were presented at different time points before or after the 
execution of one of the actions. Our results showed higher sensitivity (d') to motion 
discrimination (i.e., upward vs. downward) for congruent than incongruent stimuli when 
these stimuli where presented later than about 220ms before action onset. This result 
demonstrates that the anticipation of the action’s effect takes place during action 
preparation.  
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The current study is important in the context of the comparison of voluntary and 
stimulus-driven action control. Ziessler and Nattkemper (2011) tested for effect 
anticipation at different stages of the preparation/execution of stimulus-triggered actions 
(contrary to the present study, in which actions were voluntary). Their participants 
learned that the responses to certain target letters triggered contingently another letter on 
the screen. Thereafter, the target letters were presented along with the effects of the 
correct response, effects of other responses, or neutral letters. Ziessler and Nattkemper 
manipulated the stimulus onset asynchrony between target stimuli and the flanker. 
Contrary to the results reported above, they found that the flankers influenced response 
times only at 0 or positive SOAs (flanker presented after the target). They conclude that 
effect-related information from the flanker stimuli is involved only in late phases of 
response preparation/execution to enable the evaluation of the action. The fact that we 
observed evidence of effect anticipation up to 220ms before movement onset might 
suggest that stimulus-driven and voluntary actions differ in the role effect anticipation 
plays in action preparation and execution, with effect anticipation being involved earlier 
in the course of motor preparation for voluntary than for stimulus-driven action control. 
This notion would fit to the suggestion of Herwig, Prinz and Waszak (2007) that 
stimulus-driven and voluntary action control draw to a different degree on anticipatory 
mechanisms. 
Note that the effect we assessed in the present experiment should be considered to be a 
lower bound of the start of effect anticipation. This is because we assess effect 
anticipation when it already affects perception. Our results, thus, likely reflect a 
processing stage that is already rather advanced, in that it involves a perceptual 
representation of the effect. Prior to this stage, the anticipated effect might be represented 
in a format that is not so closely related to perception and, therefore, did not influence the 
d’-s in our experiment. 
We need to point out that our results are in line with the prediction made by the 
preactivation hypothesis (see previous chapter). In the present experiment participants 
were required to identify the stimuli. Our result is predicted by the pre-activation model 
of action-effect prediction. This model suggests that voluntary action results in the pre-
activation of the sensory network that represent the action’s expected perceptual 
consequence, thus increasing the mean level of activity in this network to some pedestal 
level (Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010; Roussel, Hughes, & Waszak, 2013; Waszak et al., 
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2012). Although if congruent stimuli are perceived less easily when they have to be 
detected in noise, they are identified more easily when they have to be discriminated 
from another stimulus (cf. Study 6; Roussel, Allenmark, & Waszak, in preparation). 
Indeed, note that identification differs from detection, in that the differentiation between 
2 stimuli is not based on the activity in one selective neural population. Instead, in 
identification tasks the perceived difference between stimuli relies on the competition 
between different neural populations (see previous chapter).  
 
In sum, the current experiment sought to elucidate the dynamics of action-effect 
anticipation by tracing the time course of its perceptual consequences. The temporal 
dynamics of our effect suggest that the perceptual modulation of action-effect prediction 
occurs at later stages of motor preparation (220ms the execution of an action - note that 
pre-movement activity later than 150ms before movement is most likely attributable to 
motor execution processes, see Gratton, Coles, Sirevaag, Eriksen, & Donchin, 1988), that 
is when specific motor command is going to be delivered to muscles. Thus if specific 
preactivation of the coding sensory network there is it seems to be driven by the latter 
stage of motor preparation. This appears to be in line with Pacherie’s model of voluntary 
action (2008) were the representation of the effect outcome gets more and more specified 
in terms of sensory consequence along the specification of the motor command.  
 
E. Study 5: Preactivation due to sensory input 
This chapter is based on: Roussel , C., Hsu, Y-F., Waszak, F., Repetition 
priming results in sensitivity attenuation. [In Prep] 
In the previous chapters we outlined the preactivation model and showed that the model 
can explain certain perceptual consequences of action effect anticipation, such as sensory 
attenuation. The preactivation hypothesis is based on the notion that a sensory pathway 
can be activated before the actual presence of the stimulus. This idea, thus, implies that 
the preactivation itself can be considered as a sensory input (Waszak et al, 2012). As a 
matter of course, action-based preactivation does not need to be the only source of neural 
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preactivation. For instance, it has been shown that mental imagery of a stimulus 
interferes with the true perception of the same stimulus, just as action-based prediction 
does (Craver-Lamley, 1987; Perky, 1910; see Waszak et al., 2012, for a review; a more 
detailed discussion of that topic is provided in the general discussion).  
Another parallel can be drawn between action-based preactivation and repetition-based 
practivation of sensory pathways. Notably, it has been shown that when a stimulus is 
repeated the associated neural activity is decreased (“repetition suppression”, see Grill-
Spector, Henson & Martin, 2006, for a review). It has been suggested that this 
phenomenon could be related to the neural correlates of sensory attenuation (Waszak et 
al, 2012). In the present study we discuss in detail this notion and we assessed whether 
stimulus repetition leads to the same perceptual effect as the prediction of an actions 
outcome.   
Repetition priming refers to the change in the ability to perform a task on a stimulus as a 
consequence of a former encounter with that very same item (for a review see Schacter & 
Slotnick, 2004). Repetition priming has been used extensively in behavioural 
experiments to investigate implicit memory. It is usually assessed using cognitive tasks 
in which participants have to identify repeated and non-repeated stimuli, most of the time 
words or objects, or to make some sort of decision based on one or more features of the 
item. The main finding of priming studies is that task performance is improved when the 
target stimulus is repeated compared to when it is not repeated. Since priming can be 
dissociated from explicit recall and recognition of the items, this has been taken as 
evidence for the existence of implicit memory (e.g., Hamann & Squire, 1997). 
Repetition priming has been shown to take place on different levels, from perceptual-
conceptual (Sayres & Grill-Spector, 2006; Friese, Supp, Hipp, Engel & Gruber, 2012) to 
motor levels (Dobbins, Schnyer, Verfaellie & Schacter, 2004; Hsu & Waszak, 2012; 
Moutsopoulou & Waszak, 2012). On all these levels, repetition results in faster and more 
accurate performance. As concerns the underlying brain mechanisms, neuroimaging 
studies have demonstrated repetition priming to be based on decreased brain activity 
following item repetition (for reviews see Grill-Spector et al., 2006; Henson & Rugg, 
2003). This decrease in activity across stimulus repetition has been referred to as 
repetition suppression. It has been demonstrated with single-cell recordings in monkeys 
(Miller & Desimone, 1994), as well as in humans using fMRI (Grill-Spector & Malach, 
2001) and EEG/MEG (Henson, Rylands, Ross, Vuilleumeir & Rugg, 2004). Several 
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models have been proposed in the literature to account for neural repetition suppression 
(see Grill-Spector et al., 2006). The sharpening model assumes that repetition 
suppression is due to a repeated stimulus being represented more sparsely, because the 
firing rate of neurons responding to irrelevant features decreases across repetitions 
(Desimone, 1996; Wiggs & Martin, 1998; Kok, Jehee, & de Lange, 2012). According to 
the facilitation model, repetition suppression is due to stimuli being processed more 
quickly when presented more than once (i.e., neurons firing for a shorter period of time) 
(Henson & Rugg, 2003; James & Gauthier, 2006). The fatigue model, finally, suggests 
that repetition suppression results from neurons being less responsive when a stimulus is 
repeated due to firing rate adaptation and synaptic depression (Grill-Spector & Malach, 
2001; Kaliukhovich & Vogels, 2011). Grill-Spector et al. (2006) speculate that the 
different models explain repetition suppression at different time scales, with the 
sharpening model and the facilitation model accounting for long-term repetition 
suppression across intervening trials and the fatigue model accounting for short-lived 
repetition suppression that operates within a few hundred milliseconds after immediate 
repetitions of a stimulus. 
Recently, repetition suppression has been discussed as a possible mechanism for a 
phenomenon called sensory attenuation (cf., Waszak et al., 2012). Sensory attenuation 
refers to the finding that self-generated stimuli are perceived as less intense than 
externally generated stimuli (e.g., Blakemore et al., 1998; Sato, 2008; Cardoso-Leite et 
al., 2010; Roussel et al., 2013). Several studies also investigated this effect with 
neurophysiological correlates of anticipated action effects. It has been shown that when 
the stimulus is anticipated the neural response is reduced compared to externally 
triggered or not anticipated stimuli (e.g., Schäfer & Marcus, 1973; Blakemore et al., 
1998; Baess et al., 2008; Aliu et al., 2009; Gentsch & Schütz-Bosbach, 2011; Hughes & 
Waszak, 2011; Hughes et al., 2013b; Roussel et al., under review). Waszak et al. (2012) 
suggest that sensory attenuation of self-produced stimuli (i.e., anticipated action effects) 
is based on similar if not identical neural mechanisms as repetition suppression. As 
outline above, they suggest that sensory attenuation may be due to a change in the 
baseline-to-signal ratio due to a preactivation of the sensory network (Cardoso-Leite et 
al., 2011; Waszak et al., 2012; Roussel et al., 2012). Under this account action effect 
anticipation would result in the specific preactivation of the coding network. Sensory 
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attenuation would reflect the decrease in differential activity between an increased 
baseline due to preactivation and the signal activity.  
Importantly, if action effect anticipation, as suggested by the preactivation account, 
results in activity similar to the activity triggered by the true perception of the anticipated  
stimulus, then the activity triggered by a correctly anticipated action effect is actually the 
repetition of the anticipation-based activity. As a consequence, a correctly anticipated 
action effect should be subject to the same neural dynamics as a stimulus that is truly 
repeated, at least to a certain degree. Sensory attenuation could, thus, be due to neural 
sharpening, facilitation, and/or fatigue. For example, fatigue of a network of neurons 
coding for a stimulus is basically equivalent to an increase of the baseline activity as 
described above. Under a fatigue hypothesis, a neuron that has been preactivated as a 
consequence of internal effect anticipation would not be available to code for the same 
stimulus when the true action effect appears. 
Note that the effects of repetition priming and action effect anticipation on performance 
seem to be conflictive. Repetition priming has been demonstrated to enhance 
performance (Morton, 1969; Tenpenny, 1995), whereas action effect anticipation results 
in sensory attenuation, i.e., a decrease in perceptual performance (Cardoso-Leite et al., 
2010; Roussel et al., 2013). However, studies on sensory attenuation are usually 
psychophysical studies in which participants are required to detect a stimulus in noise or 
to indicate the stimulus’ intensity. Repetition priming experiments, on the other side, 
never used a psychophysical detection protocol. Instead, participants are usually required 
to respond the identity of the stimulus. Identification differs from detection, in that the 
differentiation between two stimuli is not based on the activity in one selective neural 
population. Instead, in identification tasks the perceived difference between stimuli relies 
on the competition between different neural populations. As has been outlined above, a 
preactivation account predicts that although anticipated stimuli are perceived less easily 
when they have to be detected in noise, they are identified more easily when they have to 
be discriminated from another stimulus (cf., Roussel, Allenmark, & Waszak, in prep. see 
Study 6). Improved identification of correctly anticipated action effects has indeed been 
demonstrated recently (Desantis, Roussel, & Waszak, under review; study 4).    
 
If mechanisms of action effect anticipation and repetition priming are similar, then we 
should observe the same perceptual effects in case of a repeated stimulus as in case of a 
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stimulus that is anticipated by an action. That is, a repeated stimulus should be 
perceptually attenuated. The present study tests this notion. We adapted a luminance 
discrimination protocol that has been used before successfully to assess perceptual 
sensitivity and response bias of anticipated and unanticipated visual action effects 
(Roussel et al., 2013, Roussel et al., [under review]). Roussel et al. made participants 
learn an association between left and right key presses and the presentation of the letters 
A and H, respectively. They then made participants perform left and right key presses 
that randomly triggered presentation of either an H or and A at one of two possible 
contrasts. Participants were required to make discrimination judgment between the two 
contrasts. They showed contrast discrimination to be worse when the prediction (H or A, 
as learned during the association phase of the experiment) matches the true stimulus, 
demonstrating sensory attenuation. The present study uses the same protocol. However, 
instead of testing contrast discrimination of stimuli that have been correctly anticipated 
by an action or not, we assessed contrast discrimination when a (Gabor grating) stimulus 
is congruently repeated (same orientation) versus when it is incongruently repeated 
(different orientation). We predicted that contrast discrimination performance will be 
worse for congruent than for incongruent stimuli.   
 Experimental part: Repetition Priming results in sensitivity attenuation 
a Material & Method 
 Stimuli 
Experimental stimuli were generated and presented with Matlab 2007b using the 
psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997; Kleiner et al, 2007). The stimuli 
were two tilted Gabor gratings (45° left, 45° right) displayed on a 15 inches CRT monitor 
at a 80Hz refresh rate and fitted into a virtual square of 2.9 degrees of visual angle. The 
screen resolution was set at 800*600 pixels. These two stimuli were presented at two 
different contrast values (C0 and C1; see contrast determination phase) at the center of 
the screen. The primes were identical to the target stimuli except for the luminance which 
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was set at 10% more than C1 (to be sure that the prime exceeded the detection threshold). 
We used in all our phases a uniform noise texture to increase perceptual variance. This 
noise was a 100*100 matrix filled with an equal number of white and black pixels. The 
matrix was re-sampled (using the randperm function in Matlab) on each screen refresh. 
The mean luminance of the noise was then equal to the gray background. 
 
 Contrast determination phase 
In order to determine individual contrast values C0 and C1 yielding a discrimination d’ 
of about 2, every participant completed a psychophysical staircase converging on 85% 
correct responses in an orientation identification phase (Right versus Left tilt). We 
employed an adaptive staircase to manipulate stimulus transparency using an accelerated 
stochastic approximation algorithm as described by Kesten (1958). The initial step size 
was 20 and we stopped the staircase when the step size was 1 (in transparency). The 
correct response rated was used to ensure that the stimuli were supraliminal and that we 
could then independently manipulate discrimination. We used this contrast value as the 
referential contrast C0 in a 2AFC paradigm (with constant stimuli ranging from C0 to 
C0+12%) in order to calculate, the contrast value of C1 yielding 85% correct responses 
in a contrast discrimination task (C0 vs. C1). For an ideal observer, this contrast yields a 
discrimination d’ of around 2 (Mcmillan & Creelman, 1991). Previous experiments 
showed this procedure to work reliably. 
For each subject the prime contrast was set at C1+10% transparency to ensure perfect 
visibility of it.  
 
 Test Phase.  
Participants fixated a square at the center of the screen, just as in the contrast 
determination phase. The offset of the prime was followed in a fix interval of 100ms by 
the target onset. Both prime and target had a 200 ms duration. The right or left 
orientation were presented randomly, such that 50% of the stimuli were congruent with 
the prime (i.e., the Gabor grating were identical), and 50% were incongruent (i.e., the 
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Gabor grating had the opposite orientation). The target stimuli appeared randomly (but in 
equal proportions) with the luminance C0 or the luminance C1. Participants were told 
that there were two luminance values and examples of these two were shown before each 
test block. After the target stimulus had disappeared participants were required to judge 
the luminance value of the stimulus in a forced choice. Participants completed 10 tests 
blocks of 40 trials. 
 
Figure 16: Representation of the experimental design. Congruency was manipulated by the match between the 
prime and the target. The target could appear at 2 different contrast value, C0 or C1. The Participant had to indicate the 
contrast at which the target appeared. 
 Participants 
Fifteen participants took part in the experiment. They were naive to the purpose of the 
experiment. Two of these fifteen participants were excluded from the analysis as their 
mean luminance discrimination d’ was below 1. 
 
 Analysis of discrimination performance 
The luminance discrimination task was considered to be a yes/no protocol, with C1 being 
the target. That is, a C1 response to a C1 stimulus is a hit, a C1 response to a C0 stimulus 
is a false alarm, etc. d’ and c are calculated using d′ = z(hit rate) − z(false alarm rate) 
and c = −0.5 × [z(hit rate)+ z(false alarm rate)])3. D’ and c were calculated separately for 
congruent and incongruent trials.   
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b Results 
 
We analyzed our data dependent on participants’ contrast discrimination. Discrimination 
performance (d’) was lower in the congruent condition (d’ congruent: 1.79) than in the 
incongruent (d’ incongruent: 2.04) condition. A repeated measure analysis of variance 
including the factor of congruency showed this effect of congruency on d’ to be 
significant (F(1,12)=7.033, p=0.02). At the same time, the criterion was not different in 
the two congruency conditions (F(1,12) = 0.324, p = 0.58) (congruent: 0.40 , incongruent 
: 0.44).  
c Discussion 
In this study we assessed the hypothesis that stimulus repetition, which is found to induce 
repetition suppression at the neuronal level, is associated with decreased performance in 
contrast discrimination. We showed that when the prime and the target were identical, 
participants were less able to discriminate stimulus intensity. The finding that a repeated 
stimulus was perceptually attenuated resembles the common finding of sensory 
attenuation research, where self-generated stimuli are perceived as less intense and more 
difficult to be detected. The decreased performance is likely due to the change in the 
baseline-to-signal ratio, where there is a decrease in differential activity between an 
increased baseline and the signal activity. 
This result supports the idea that repetition suppression may be the underlying 
mechanism for sensory attenuation (Caroso-Leite et al., 2011; Waszak et al., 2012; 
Roussel et al., 2013). The preactivation account in action effect anticipation research 
predicts that anticipated stimuli are perceived less easily when they have to be detected in 
noise because there is a decrease in differential activity between an increased baseline 
and the signal activity.  
A possible scenario is that anticipation preactivates the corresponding neuronal 
representation, increasing the neuronal activity at the baseline. Given that 
neurophysiological data are baseline-corrected, trial-by-trial, more neuronal activity was 
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removed from the activation triggered by anticipated stimuli. This manifests as a 
reduction in neuronal responses triggered by anticipated stimuli.    
Our interpretation is also compatible with the predictive coding model (Friston, 2005, 
2009; Egner, Monti, & Summerfield, 2010). The predictive coding model postulates that 
perception entails two distinct neurocomputation components, the top-down propagation 
of predictions and the bottom-up propagation of prediction errors. The brain is believed 
to work as a predictive machine constantly attempting to match sensory inputs with 
predictions (Clark, 2013). The preactivation account mainly describes the activity in the 
prediction units, where there is increased activation before stimulus onset. Such 
preactivation of the corresponding neuronal representation would lead to a reduction in 
neuronal responses triggered by anticipated stimuli as well as improved stimulus 
identification. Using multivariate pattern analysis techniques on fMRI data, Kok and 
colleagues (Kok, Jehee, & de Lange, 2012) also found that perceptual expectation 
reduces the neuronal response amplitude but improves the stimulus representation in the 
primary visual cortex. 
Obviously, the predictive coding model shares a number of features with the 
preactivation account outlined above. Therefore, in the following chapter, we aimed to 
unify the two models.     
F. Study 6: A Predictive coding account of 
preactivation 
This Chapter is based on: Roussel , C., Allenmark, F. & Waszak, F., Toward a 
better understanding of action effect prediction: A predictive coding model 
of sensory preactivation. [In Prep]   
Philosophers have for a long time been referring to the concept of Umwelt, which is the 
fact that our knowledge of the world relies on the physical properties of our bodies. The 
notion that perception depends on the perceptual organs that allow us to perceive the 
external world raised another question. How is it possible to recognize a given object 
although the sensory input we receive depends on the context (for example light, 
orientation …)? Helmholtz (1860), for example, distinguished “perception” and 
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“sensation” in order to explain why from which ever any angle I observe my desk, it is 
only the sensation that changes (e.g., the visual information) whereas the perception 
remains the same (e.g., the knowledge of what it is). Hence perception appears to be the 
process by which we recognize the causes of our sensory inputs. The existence of such 
inferential processes in the perceptual system has been hypothesized and supported in 
visual and auditory domains (see Kersten, Mamassian & Yuille, 2004; Pressnitzer, Suied, 
& Shamma, 2011; for a review in the visual and auditory domain, respectively). These 
inferential processes have been studied under the Bayesian framework. In computational 
modeling the Bayesian framework has been implemented into empirical Bayes (a 
statistical implementation of the Bayesian probability theory). Empirical Bayes claims 
that prior expectations can be abstracted from the sensory data, using a hierarchical 
model of how those data were caused (Friston, 2002, 2003). Predictive coding theory 
implements empirical Bayes methods using a modern statistical approach, in which prior 
expectations are used to compute a prediction error, which, in turn, is used to adjust the 
state of the system until this error is minimized. This idea is also related to the 
forward/inverse model outlined above. In the comparator model (Wolpert et al., 1995; 
Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000) the system compares input and expectation to infer 
whether action consequences are as expected. But unlike the forward/inverse model, the 
predictive coding theory, implement priors, prediction error and inference of the cause of 
the activity at every level of the perceptual process (for more details, see Friston, 2005).   
Predictive coding is based on a hierarchical organization of the brain; each level tries to 
explain the activity at this level and the level below through the use of priors. These 
priors are implemented by two components. First, the synaptic organization between two 
types of units, Error units (Eneurons) and Representational units (Rneurons). This 
synaptic organization is shaped through learning and “represents” the statistical 
regularities of the systems environment. Second the activity coming from the backward 
connections, which represent the systems current expectation of the incoming signal. The 
activity in the Representational units will be compared by the Error units to the incoming 
signal from the level below. The activity in the Representational units is then adjusted to 
minimize the prediction error (see Figure 17).  
The preactivation model postulates that future sensory input is predicted by the 
preactivation of the neural network coding for the actual stimulus. In the preactivation 
model of sensory attenuation the sensory pathway is preactivated through motor 
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preparatory processes (see Chapter I.E and Study 1 & 2). Thus, the architecture of the 
predictive coding model can give a more detailed neural basis for this notion.  
As a consequence, we crafted a visual predictive coding system, which can be 
preactivated by the motor system (or otherwise) and tested whether the model can 
explain some of data provided above.  
 Modeling work:  
a Model  
We based our model on Friston’s (2005) predictive coding scheme. This model is a 
simplified version of the predictive coding model, without learning phase (that is, the 
synaptic weights of the connections between the errors neurons and the representational 
neurons are pre-set). It is constituted of one layer (e.g., level of interaction between R and E 
units; see Figure 17). In this layer two Rneurons were modeled and each was optimally 
tuned to respond to an oriented Gabor grating (45° and – 45° from the vertical orientation 
respectively). The receptive field of those neurons covered a square of 2.9° visual angle, 
such that they could process the exact same stimulus as presented in Experiments 3 and 5. 
We modeled 1681 error neurons corresponding to the number of pixel contain in our 
stimulus. Each of these Eneurons compares the Rneurons activity to its corresponding 
pixel. The stimulus was a Gabor grating fitted into a square of 2.9° visual angle oriented in 
one of the two possible orientations. For modeling purposes we represented the stimulus in 
a 1x1681 vector containing values from -1 to 1, -1 coding for fully black and 1 fully white 
(noted I).  In our model this stimulus was considered to be at the maximal strength. That is 
to say, the contrast of this stimulus would saturate the R neurons’ activity.  
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Figure 17: Representation of our predictive coding based model of sensory preactivation. When a stimulus is 
presented the Errors neurons computes the difference between the incoming signal and the corresponding 
Representational neurons activity. This error will by way of forward connections be transmitted to the Representational 
neurons which will adjust their activity to diminish the prediction error by an optimization process tuned to infer the 
cause of the stimulation. Activity in R1 predicts that the source of the stimulation is a rightward tilted grating, while 
activity in R2 predicts the presence of a leftward tilted stimulus. In the case of a preactivation induced prediction of a 
rightward tilted stimulus, R1 is already activated before the stimulus onset (t0) while R2 is not. At the time of stimulus 
onset (t1) the error is maximal and different hypothesis about the source of this prediction error are “tested” (both R1 
and R2 fires). At the end of the optimization process (t2) the causes of the activity (a rightward tilted stimulus) had 
been inferred, thus the prediction error is null and R1 is the only representational neuron to fire.      
 
To do so we modeled the Eneurons and Rneurons with a hyperbolic tangent function 
such that the neural activity was nonlinear and constraint between -1 and 1 (noted th(x)). 
In order to vary the stimulus contrast we set a parameter varying from 0 to 1 to multiply 
the Image vector(I).    
According to the Predictive Coding framework any stimulus presentation will generate 
error given the synaptic arrangement of the system. Then an optimization process will by 
gradient descent modify the activity of the R-neurons in order to minimize the total error. 
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The error (E) equals the difference between the product of the synaptic weight matrix (w) 
with the previous state of the Rneuron and the current input. Such that for each step k of 
the process . 
The optimization by gradient descent giving the subsequent activity in the Rneurons was 
a minimization of the error as a function of the Rneuron activity. The gradient descent is 
performed in the algorithm by taking a step  in the direction of the gradient at each step 
of the optimization process. In our algorithm the gradient was implemented such that for 
each step k of the process  
 
The algorithm was programmed to stop the optimization process when the error changes 
by less than 0.00001 between steps.  Finally to study the Preactivation Hypothesis we 
could preactivate the Rneurons. Since the neuronal activity was constrained between -1 
and 1 the preactivation value could be between these values.  
 
b Results 
 
By looking at the model results in the total absence of noise we can observe that the 
Rneuron response to a stimulus converges to an activity equal to the presented intensity 
(Figure 18).  
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Figure 18: This figure shows the activity contained in R1 when a rightward tilted stimulus is presented to the 
model at different intensities, when there is or not preactivation in R1. 
That is, the model could represent perfectly the stimulus at any given intensity. Despite the 
apparent similarity with our previous model (Roussel et al., 2013; Study 1), we would like 
to point out that there are substantial differences between this and the former model. The 
two main differences are the following. First the neural activity is changing over time for a 
given stimulus intensity while the former model considered just a global activity function of 
the stimulus contrast. Second in this model the activity with or without preactivation finally 
converges to the same point, just as in the predictive coding model, indicating that the cause 
of the activity had been properly inferred. However, the integration over time of the neural 
activity is higher when there is preactivation than when there is not. Note, however, that 
just as in the preactivation hypothesis this increase due to preactivation is a nonlinear 
function of contrast. That is to say, the gain in activity due to preactivation decreases the 
more the contrast increases. To further test the preactivation hypothesis with the current 
model, we tested whether the model could fit the results we obtained in Experiments 3 and 
5. To do so we choose to base the model response on the 50
th
 step in the optimization 
process (more detail about this will be provided in the discussion).   
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 Sensitivity Attenuation / Repetition suppression  
 
To model Sensitivity Attenuation we reproduced the protocol introduced by Roussel et al. 
(2013). These authors made participants learn an association between left and right key 
presses and the presentation of two different stimuli respectively. They then made 
participants perform left and right key presses that randomly triggered a stimulus presented 
at one of two possible contrasts. Participants were required to make a discrimination 
judgment between the two contrasts. This paradigm was equivalent to the paradigm used in 
Experiment 5, with the difference that the congruency was not driven by the action effect 
contingencies but by the fast repetition of two identical stimuli. For the sake of coherence 
with the modeling in Experiment 1 the preactivation was set to a level of 8%. Moreover, C0 
and C1 values were set to the mean C0 and C1 values used in Experiment 5 (in terms of the 
maximal contrast value (just as in our first model)). C0 and C1 were, thus, set to 27.13% 
and 32.17% of the maximal contrast respectively. In order to model the discrimination 
response we set a threshold at the mean of C0 and C1 (29.65). That is, once the activity of 
the R neuron reached the threshold the model would concludes that the contrast is C1, C0 
otherwise. To keep the model test as similar as possible to the experiment we added noise 
to the stimulus. The signal to noise ratio was estimated in order to fit the experimental d’. 
We found that with 13% of noise the d’ with preactivation was 2.07 while it was 2.28 
without preactivation. This discrepancy with the actual experimental d’ in study 5 (d’: 1.79 
and 2.04 with and without preactivation respectively) can be explained by the fact that we 
didn’t yet find the best model parameters to fit the data. But it is to be noticed that 8% of 
preactivation results in a d’ reduction of about 10% just as in our experiments, in the first 
model and in Cardoso-Leite et al. (2010).  
Regarding to the Error Response (figure 19) until the error converges to the minimal point 
preactivation induces globally less prediction error. 
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Figure 19: Sum of the absolute value of the error neurons’ response. It appears that when there is preactivation the 
error induced by the presentation of the stimulus is less important until the prediction error had been minimized. 
 Increased Identification  
It has been shown by previous experiments that action-effect associations have a 
facilitatory effect on identification performance (Study 3 & 4). The preactivation 
hypothesis postulates that, while preactivation leads to sensitivity attenuation along one 
dimension, it leads to increased perceptual distance between two different dimensions (e.g., 
it will reduce the competition between the possible alternatives; see Figure 13 in part II.C). 
To test whether the predictive coding model behaves in line with this hypothesis we looked 
at the response given by our two representational neurons for a rightward tilted stimulus. 
The response pattern of both R1 and R2 without noise added to the stimulus is presented in 
Figure 20.   
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Figure 19: Activity in the Rneurons R1 and R2 for a rightward tilted stimulus, with and without preactivation. 
The response of R1 is similar to the response observed in Figure18. Concerning the 
response of R2 to a rightward tilted stimulus it is to be noted that there is activity in R2. 
This suggests that the model first also “tests” the hypothesis that the source of the activity is 
a leftward tilted stimulus. But since this activity in R2 does not minimize the error it 
decreases until the error is minimized by the activity in R1. 
Moreover preactivation (of R1) increases the activity in R1 (just as in Figure 18) and 
reduces the activity in R2. This is due to the fact that the response in R1 and R2 are linked 
through the error neurons. A preactivation in R1 reduces from the first step on the 
prediction error, making the hypothesis of a leftward tilted stimulus “less likely”. 
In order to fit the experimental data provided in Experiment 3 we used the mean contrast 
value of Experiment 3 (in percentage of the maximal contrast (22%)). To obtain a close fit 
of the experimental d’ we had to decrease the signal to noise ratio. To do so we increased to 
40% the noise intensity. This decrease in the signal to noise ratio was necessary because 
our simplification of the predictive coding model made the Rneurons very resistant to 
noise. The model responded following a simple competition rule. The “perceived” 
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orientation was given by the Rneuron discharging the most (i.e., if the activity in R1 was 
higher than in R2 the model responded that the stimulus was rightward tilted and vice 
versa). Doing so, the model resulted in d’-s of about 2 and 1.8 with and without 
preactivation, respectively (we discuss this fit in detail in the discussion).   
 
Figure 21: Left panel) Integral distribution of R2 responses to a rightward tilted stimulus, when R1 is preactivated 
(light green) or not (dark green). Right panel) Integral distribution of R1 responses to a rightward tilted stimulus when 
R1 is preactivated (magenta) or not (red). 
Regarding the integral response distributions, the pattern is similar to the one presented in 
Figure 20. The distribution of R1 responses (Figure 21 left panel) to a rightward tilted 
stimulus shifts toward more activity when R1 is preactivated while the distribution of R2 
responses (Figure 21 right panel) to a rightward tilted stimulus shifts toward less activity 
when R1 is preactivated. 
c Discussion 
In this study we crafted a predictive coding model detecting Gabor gratings of two 
different orientations. Based on this architecture we tested the preactivation hypothesis of 
action effect prediction. We postulated that preactivation results in pre-stimulus 
activation of the corresponding representational units. We have shown that our model is 
able to explain perceptual consequences of effect anticipation such as sensitivity 
attenuation and the improvement of identification performance.   
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However, we would like to point out that the fit of our experimental data is not optimal 
yet, as we did not yet find the best model parameters. This is mostly due to the fact that 
the simulation takes a lot of time to estimate the parameters. Note that the fits of 
Experiment 3 (Identification paradigm) are more deviant from the actual data than the fits 
of Experiment 5. This is due to the fact that we modeled a congruent vs. neutral condition 
since we assessed the contrast between with preactivation vs. without preactivation. That 
is, we showed that the identification d' in congruent trials is better than in neutral trials, 
whereas the d' in incongruent trials is worse than in neutral trials (see Appendix 3). 
It has been suggested that EEG signals are primarily based on activity of the error 
neurons (Friston, 2005; Friston & Kiebel, 2009). This suggestion is based on the 
assumption that the Error units consist in the superficial pyramidal cells of the brain 
while the Representational neurons are thought to be located in deeper layers (Mumford, 
1992; Friston, 2005; Friston & Kieble, 2009). The notion that neurophysiological data, 
like early sensory ERPs, reflect the error signal provides a nice account of the 
compatibility between the preactivation hypothesis and the neural correlates of sensory 
attenuation and repetition priming (for short terms repetition). On the one hand, the 
motor based prediction of an action effect (as well as the repetition of a stimulus) results 
in a decrease of the observed ERP components. This has been taken to indicate that the 
predicted stimulus induces less activity than the unpredicted stimulus. On the other hand, 
the preactivation hypothesis claims that action effect prediction should results in a 
general increase of activity in the network representing the effect. However, as we 
demonstrated above, the prediction error elicited by a stimulus decreases in the presence 
of preactivation. It is only the activity in the Rneurons that increases.  
Our decision to extract the model data at the 50
th
 step as the model response on a given 
trial needs to be discussed.  Since the model converged on the same activity for a given 
contrast value, irrespective of whether there is preactivation or not, we could not simply 
use the end point of the process. Apart of using a particular step of the algorithm, we saw 
two other possibilities. First, we could integrate the Rneuron activity until the end of the 
process. Second, we could set a threshold the model response has to reach.   
However, the integration of activity until the end of the optimization does not lead to 
comparable results between conditions, since the number of steps the model needs to 
converge differs depending on the stimulus intensity and the preactivation activity.  
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The absolute threshold method is not a suitable option either. As a matter of fact, since 
without the addition of noise the convergence activity is identical irrespective of the 
preactivation, a threshold in noisy conditions would merely reflect the effect of the noise.  
In order to capture the effect of preactivation in a comparable way between the 
conditions, the intensity values and the different fits,  the best option consisted in finding 
a processing step were we could compare every combination of these parameters. We 
opted for step 50.  
Admittedly, it is difficult to relate the optimization steps of our model to the temporal 
dynamics of the neural process. The brain does not necessarily minimize prediction error 
by gradient descent. However, we would like to point out that the model dynamics very 
well represents well known RT phenomena. It has been shown, for example, that the 
response time to a stimulus decreases with increasing stimulus intensity (Luce, 1959). 
Our model makes very similar predictions. The stronger the stimulus is, the fewer 
optimization steps are necessary to get to the same threshold activity (see Figure 18; the 
increase of R1 activity is sharper for intensity 0.7 than 0.3). It has also been shown that 
the perceived intensity of a stimulus varies as a function of stimulus duration until it 
reaches a saturation point (Stevens & Hall, 1966). This is in line with the activity in the 
Rneurons of our model. Moreover, there is ample evidence for the existence of speed 
accuracy trade off (for review see Wickelgren, 1977):  accuracy is an inverse function of 
the speed of the perceptual decision. In our model the step at which the perceptual 
decision is taken fits exactly this notion: the sooner the optimization process takes a 
decision the less probable it is that the inferred cause of the activity is accurate. Thus, we 
consider the optimization process to represent the temporal dynamic of the perceptual 
process rather well.   
Note that by assessing the model data before the end of the optimization we postulate that 
the perceptual difference between predicted and unpredicted stimuli emerge during the 
stimulus processing rather than at the end of the process. 
The decision to use exactly the 50
th
 steps is based on more practical reasons. For 
instance, the number of steps needed to get to the convergence activity differed trial by 
trial as a function of the noise, the stimulus intensity and the preactivation. Hence, in 
order to have the same number of observations in the different noise values (Sensitivity 
attenuation fit and Identification fit), the different conditions (with or without 
preactivation), and the different contrast values (C0, C1 and the contrast used in the 
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identification fit), we had to estimate the latest step reached by any of the studied 
combination.   
To conclude, we provided with this model a general support for the preactivation 
hypothesis. The model shows that a single neural mechanism can explain sensitivity 
attenuation and facilitation of identification performance (in the perceptual domain), as 
well as sensory and repetition attenuation (in the neurophysiological domain). 
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III. General Discussion 
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The ideomotor principle claims that an action and its outcome are linked by bidirectional 
associations and that actions are controlled by the internal activation of the 
desired/anticipated effect (Lotze, 1852; Greenwald, 1970; Hommel et al., 2001). Based 
on this notion, Waszak et al. (2012) introduced the preactivation account supposed to 
explain several perceptual phenomena observed in the domain of action control, for 
example, sensory attenuation.  In this present thesis this preactivation hypothesis was 
assessed in detail.   
In study 1, we introduced a model of the preactivation hypothesis derived a new 
hypothesis about sensitivity attenuation (i.e., we predicted a decrease in contrast 
discrimination performance (without prediction vs. with prediction)), and tested this 
hypothesis experimentally.  
In study 2, we addressed whether neurophysiological indices of sensory attenuation 
reflected early, low-level or later, higher-level mechanisms. Moreover, we explored how 
neurophysiological and perceptual indices of sensory attenuation relate.  
In study 3 we extended the preactivation model to include identification decisions. 
In study 4 we assessed the temporal dynamics of the prediction of action effect and we 
tested the extension of the preactivation hypothesis provided in study 3.  
In study 5 we addressed the possible relationships between repetition priming and the 
preactivation hypothesis. 
In study 6, finally, we introduced a new preactivation model based on a predictive coding 
architecture. We also showed that this model explains the effects demonstrated in the 
previous studies. 
In this discussion we discuss three main points. First, we will redefine ‘preactivation’ in 
the light of the findings outlined above.  Second, we discuss our results and the 
preactivation hypothesis within a more general view of the literature. Third, we address 
the question of how the preactivation hypothesis might help us to better understand 
voluntary action control.  
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What is preactivation? 
The preactivation hypothesis refers to the idea that the prediction of an action effect 
relies on the preactivation of the specific sensory network which would be involved in 
the processing of the (predicted) stimulus. In this thesis we demonstrated that such a 
mechanism indeed might explain a range of perceptual phenomena that have been 
observed in the domain of action control. 
Preactivation is thought to be specific to the predicted stimulus. All studies presented 
above confirmed this claim, by assessing the effect of preactivation systematically with 
stimuli that matched or did not match a previously learnt action-effect association. Also 
the term preactivation refers to the activation of the specific sensory pathway before the 
presentation of the stimulus. In Experiment 4 we demonstrated that effect anticipation 
can influence perception from about 220ms before the action’s onset. This is in line with 
the idea that preactivation is related to the preparatory stages of the action and also, of 
course, with the ideomotor theory of action control claiming that an action is selected by 
the internal anticipation of its consequence (Greenwald, 1970; Hommel et al., 2001; 
Prinz, 1997). In study 1, 2, 5 and 6, we demonstrated that the preactivation model 
predicts a sensitivity loss in contrast discrimination tasks (congruent trials worse than 
incongruent trials) and we provided support in favor of this hypothesis. In study 3, 4 and 
6, we demonstrated that the preactivation of the sensory pathway should result in the 
facilitation of identification performance and provided support for this hypothesis. 
Hence, it appears that the preactivation model could explain how the prediction of action 
effects is implemented in the brain.   
How is the preactivation hypothesis related to the existing literature? 
It has been highlighted in the literature (e.g., Blakemore et al., 1998, 2000) that the 
prediction of action effects results in a diminution of the perceived intensity of the effect. 
Under the preactivation hypothesis, this diminution in the perceived intensity is 
accompanied by a decrease in strength discrimination performance (thus making more 
difficult the perception of variations stimulus in strength). According to Blakemore et al., 
(1998, 2000) tickling oneself is impossible, because the sensation of the consequences of 
our own actions are attenuated. According to the preactivation tickling oneself is 
impossible because we are less able to feel the variation of strength during a self 
generated tactile stimulation. 
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However, while the link between the claim that the perceptual strength of a self-
generated stimulus is reduced and the observation that the neural response to a self-
generated stimulus is attenuated is obvious (Blakemore et al., 1998, 2000), the link 
between the preactivation hypothesis and the observation of a reduced neural activity is 
less clear.  
In this thesis we proposed several hypotheses of how the preactivation model and the 
neural correlate of sensory attenuation could relate.  
The first possibility follows the fatigue model of repetition suppression (see Grill-Spector 
et al., 2006 and Waszak et al., 2012). This model postulates that a neural network is less 
responsive to the same stimulation presented in rapid succession due to firing rate 
adaptation and synaptic depression. In this scenario neural fatigue due to preactivation 
would lead to an attenuated response of the network in response to the true effect. Note, 
however, that this model can hardly explain the facilitation in identification performance 
for predicted action effects. As a matter of course the decrease in the activity of the 
relevant neural population increases the probability of higher responses from irrelevant 
neural populations. This would result in a decrease in identification performances.   
The second scenario introduced above addresses this problem in that it postulates that     
preactivation of neuronal representations increases the baseline activity. Given that 
neurophysiological data are baseline-corrected, more neuronal activity is removed from 
the activation triggered by the stimulus if the stimulus is anticipated than if it is not 
anticipated. This would manifest as a reduction in neuronal responses triggered by 
anticipated stimuli. However, using our protocol we could not test this hypothesis (in 
study 2), because both actions were associated with an effect. We were thus not able to 
assess baseline activity.  Future research should address this notion directly.  
The third scenario sketched above relies on a predictive coding architecture. It has been 
claimed that the stimulus-driven EEG signal typically observed over perceptual areas is 
actually based on activity of error neurons (superficial pyramidal cells) whose signal is 
easily picked up by EEG (Clark, 2013; Mumford, 1992; Friston, 2005; Friston & Kiebel, 
2009). In such a scenario (see study 6), it is perfectly possible that the activity in the 
representational unit influenced by the preactivation increases while the 
neurophysiological signal measured with EEG decreases.  
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For the time being, it is impossible to decide which of these (mutually not exclusive) 
scenarios is true. However, it is evident that the notion of preactivation as introduced 
above does not contradict the neurophysiological data reported in study 2 and in the 
literature.   
Waszak et al. (2012) suggested that the preactivation hypothesis could also explain the 
phenomenon of intentional binding. As we mentioned already (Chapter I.C and I.D), 
intentional binding refers to both a shift of the perceived action onset time toward the 
stimulus and to a shift of the perceived onset time of the effect toward the action.  
Waszak et al. (2012) suggested that the preactivation of the action effect would lead to a 
decrease in the perceptual latency of the predicted stimulus, since processing has a head 
start when there is preactivation. This could account for the shift in the perceived time of 
the action’s consequence in intentional binding. The model in study 6 is in line with this 
notion, since it shows that fewer steps are needed to reach the threshold when an action 
effect had been predicted compared to when it has not.  
However, whether or not intentional binding is caused by motor predictive mechanisms 
has been critically discussed by Hughes, Desantis, and Waszak (2012). In this review the 
authors address the question of whether sensory attenuation and intentional binding are 
based on the same mechanisms. They differentiated four types of mechanism: motor 
identity prediction, identity prediction, temporal control, and temporal expectation. They 
concluded that it is likely that sensory attenuation is driven by motor predictive 
processing (motor identity prediction). The experiments reported above corroborate this 
conclusion. However, they concluded that the case is much less clear concerning 
intentional binding. This conclusion is based, amongst others, on a study in which 
intentional binding was assessed while manipulating motor predictive processes and 
keeping the other factors constant (Desantis, Hughes, & Waszak, 2012). This study failed 
to show intentional binding in the critical contrast. Hughes et al. (2013) concluded that 
intentional binding might be driven by temporal control mechanisms rather than identity 
prediction. However in Desantis et al., 2011 (see Chapter I.G and Appendix 1) it has 
been shown that temporal control is not sufficient to induce binding. In this study the 
authors manipulated the belief of agency (i.e., the participants believed in some trials that 
they produced the tone and in some trials they believed that the same tone was produced 
by somebody else). In reality the participant always produced the tone. The results 
showed a shift of the perceived time of the action effect only when the subject believed 
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to be the author of the tone. Thus, even if they were in control of the time of occurrence 
of the action consequence no intentional binding was observed. The underpinnings of 
intentional binding thus need to be further clarified. For example, assessing the 
perceptual latency of the effect outcome using psychophysical techniques (such as 
temporal order judgement) would be more appropriate to test whether there is an actual 
decrease of perceptual latency in case of action effect prediction.  
 
As it has been suggested in the literature and in the present work, the prediction of 
action-effects might result in a preactivation of the perceptual representation of the 
anticipated stimulus (Waszak et al, 2012).  In this thesis we attempted to demonstrate that 
the preactivation of the stimulus representation indeed results in observable effects, but 
that the source of the preactivation has not necessarily to be motor based, but could also 
rely on the repetition of a stimulus (Study 5). In Experiment 5 we tried to relate the 
preactivation hypothesis to an effect known as repetition priming. We showed that the 
effect of repetition was comparable to the one observed for motor based effect prediction. 
Our next aim is to show that in the exact same repetition condition we will find a 
facilitatory effect on identification performance.   
Note that repetition priming is not the only phenomenon that relates to the concept of 
preactivation. Mental imagery (i.e., the mental representation of an object or stimulus) 
can be also considered as an internal activation of the object representation (see Kaski, 
2002 for a review on this topic). Some theories claim that the imagery involves at least 
partly the same processes as perception (Kossly et al., 2001; Pearson et al., 2008). 
Interestingly, it has been shown that imagining an object can impair the detection of that 
object (Perky, 1910; Craver-Lamley and Reeves, 1987; Craver-Lamley, Reeves & 
Asterberry, 1997). For a more detailed discussion of the relationships between mental 
imagery and the preactivation hypothesis see Waszak et al., (2012).   
How does the preactivation hypothesis help us to understand voluntary action?  
Humans’ behavioral flexibility is largely based on the fact that we are able to produce 
desired effects in our environment. This ability necessitates that people are capable of 
predicting the sensory effect of their actions (cf., Hommel et al., 2001; James, 1890; 
Lotze, 1852; Prinz, 1997; Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010, Wolpert et al., 1995, 
Blakemore et al., 2000). It has recently been suggested that motor prediction is based on 
 91 
 
a template of the brain response to the predicted stimulus (Kuhn et al., 2010; Waszak et 
al., 2012; SanMiguel et al., 2013). However, although research has gathered a lot of 
evidence for the existence of motor anticipatory mechanisms (for a review see Waszak et 
al., 2012), only little is known about how the content of these prediction and the way the 
brain produces it.  
 In the present thesis we proposed a theory on the motor based predictive mechanism that 
is based on the preactivation of the sensory network representing the anticipated effect. 
The essence of ideomotor control is that action effect anticipation is an integral part of 
voluntary action selection. From this point of view, the anticipated effect must 
necessarily be represented in the brain before the action is executed. Otherwise, goal-
directed behavior would be impossible. Along the line of the intentional cascade model 
of Pacherie we argue that the preactivation of the sensory consequences of the action 
should be situated between the end of the Proximal and the Motor level (i.e, at the end of 
the preparatory stage of action and during the execution phase). Just as the ideomotor 
theory we also postulate that the efference copy is not just a one-way road from motor 
processing to the prediction of the sensory outcome of the action. The predicted 
consequence of an action can also specify the necessary motor code and/or correct it (see 
inverse and feed-forward model, Chapter I.D; Wolpert et al, 1995; see Desmurget & 
Gafton, 2000 for review). This would mean that the preactivation is also involved in the 
representation of the goal, at least for some aspect of it (e.g. the representation of the 
situated and instantaneous goal in Pacherie’s model (2008); see Chapter I.E Figure 3).  
To conclude in this thesis we started with the hypothesis that action-effect prediction 
should rely on the preactivation of the specific sensory pathway representing the 
anticipated effect. We conceived a model that allowed us to derive a certain number of 
novel predictions about the perceptual processing of action consequences. We tested 
these predictions and provided evidence in favor of the preactivation hypothesis. We also 
provided evidence to show that the preactivation of the sensory pathway that code for a 
stimulus can represent a more general mechanism of the way that the brain works by 
assessing the commonalities between motor and repetition induced preactivation. Finally 
we assessed whether the preactivation hypothesis was compatible with recent account of 
the brain functioning. 
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APPENDIX 1:  
Detailed resume of  Desantis, A., Roussel, C., & Waszak, F. (2011). On the influence of 
causal beliefs on the feeling of agency. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(4), 1211–1220. 
 
In this study we manipulated participants’ prior belief of causality and assessed whether 
this manipulation modulated intentional binding. To be more precise, participants were 
made to believe that an auditory stimulus was either triggered by themselves or by 
somebody else, although, in reality, the sound was always triggered by the participants. 
We used the Libet-clock method to measure intentional binding (Haggard, Clark, et al., 
2002; Libet et al., 1983). Contrary to other methods commonly used (e.g., interval 
estimations, see Engbert et al., 2008; Engbert, Wohlschläger, Thomas, & Haggard, 2007; 
Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009), the Libet-clock method allows for the assessment of 
both the perception of the movement and of the sensory consequence. We predicted that 
binding effects would be larger when participants are convinced that their action 
triggered the tone, compared to when they believe that somebody else’s action triggered 
the tone.  
Notice that, as we outlined before, intentional binding has been considered to 
contribute to people’s experience of authorship. A modulation of prior authorship belief 
on intentional binding would suggest that binding is also a consequence of our prior 
beliefs about the causal link between an action and a sensory change in the environment. 
a Methods 
Participants. Thirty-six subjects (average age 24.1 years; sd = 4.38) participated in the 
experiment for a payment of € 10/h. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
were naïve as to the hypothesis under investigation. 
Material. Stimulus presentation and data acquisition were conducted using Matlab 
7.5.0 for Windows XP running on a PC computer connected to two 19-in. 120 Hz CRT 
monitors.  
Stimuli and procedure. The experiment was run with a real and a bogus participant, 
hereafter referred to as the participant and the confederate. At the beginning, participant 
and confederate were told that the experiment consisted of three phases. Two baseline 
phases, one at the beginning and one at the end of the experiment, which they would 
carry out in two separate rooms, and a test phase (operant condition) between the two 
baselines which they would carry out conjointly in the same experimental room. In all 
trials (baselines and test) participants (and confederate) were presented with a clock-face 
marked with 5 ‘min’ intervals and a clock-hand (2.5 cm of length and 0.1 cm of width) 
rotating with a period of 2560 ms (Haggard, Clark, et al., 2002; Libet et al., 1983). A 
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green-shaded arc covered 120° of the clock surface (Figure 4). The position of the shaded 
arc was random (the arc could start at 90, 150, 180, 210, 270, 330 degrees of the clock-
face). The initial clock-hand position was randomly chosen within the quarter of the 
clock which followed the end of the shaded arc. 
The main task of the participants was to judge the onset-time of one of two events, a 
self-produced movement (right index finger key-press) or a tone (1000 Hz, 60 ms 
duration). In the baseline phases, movement/tone was produced/appeared alone. In the 
test phase, the participants’ movements triggered tone presentation and the participants 
were required to judge onset-times of one or the other. To do so they used a computer 
keypad with their left hand to report the clock-hand position at which the given event 
occurred. Participants knew which event to report from the beginning of each trial (see 
below).  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Example of the stimuli used during both baselines. In the movement condition (a) participants 
have to press a key within the green-shaded arc, in the sound condition (b) participants are asked to wait 
the occurrence of a sound. 
 
 
Baseline phases. The baseline phases comprised two types of block. In the 
movement condition, participants had to make a key-press within the shaded arc and to 
judge the onset-time of their movement. Participants were instructed to avoid responding 
in a stereotyped way and to concentrate on the moment they actually pressed the key. In 
the sound condition, participants were asked to wait for the occurrence of a tone 
presented via a loudspeaker. Sound onset-times were individually yoked to the 
movement production times recorded in the previous block in the movement condition. 
To be precise, we used the recorded movement production times and added one of the 
three intervals (350, 550 and 750 ms), which were used during the test phase (see below). 
The clock-hand stopped at a random position 1.000–1.600 ms after the event and then 
disappeared. Thereafter participants reported the onset-time of the movement or the 
sound depending on the condition. They were encouraged to use the highest possible 
precision, and were not restricted to use the numbers marked on the clock-face. Each 
baseline phase was organized in four blocks; each block consisted of eight movement 
trials followed by eight tone trials for a total of 32 trials per event type. 
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 Test phase. After the first baseline the confederate joined the participant to carry out 
the operant conditions. In this phase we used two monitors and a keyboard connected to 
the same PC. One monitor was in front of the participant, and the other in front of the 
confederate. The monitors and the shared keyboard were separated by a card board in 
order to prevent the participant from seeing what the confederate is doing. Before the test 
phase, participants ran two training sessions. In the first, both monitors showed the same 
clock as in the baseline phase (but without the shaded area). Participant and confederate 
were asked to carry out, alternately, a key-press. There were three conditions. In the 
subject condition the name of the participant was displayed on the screens (just below the 
clock). In this condition the participant’s key-press triggered a tone; the confederate’s 
key-press did not. In the confederate condition, the confederate’s name was displayed on 
the screens. Here, the tone followed the confederate’s key-press instead of the 
participant’s key-press. Finally, in the ambiguous condition a sequence of rhombs 
(######) was displayed on the screens. In this condition the tone was triggered randomly 
by either the confederate’s or the participant’s key-press. The aim of this training session 
was to make the participant adopt three contextual beliefs: (a) if my name is displayed, 
the tone follows my action; (b) if the other’s name is displayed, the tone follows his 
action; (c) if no name is displayed, the tone may follow my action or his action. This 
training ended when both subjects pressed their key nine times per condition. During the 
second training, the shaded arc was displayed. Both subjects had to press their key, 
alternately, within the shaded arc. As before the sound followed the key-press of the 
person whose name was displayed below the clock (or randomly one or the other in the 
ambiguous condition). The sound occurred randomly after one of three possible inter-
onset intervals (350, 550, 750 ms). The aim of the second training was to reinforce the 
belief of the participants that, depending on the condition, either the confederate or they 
themselves trigger the tone. Moreover, it was meant to familiarize participants with the 
three different SOA used during the operant conditions of the test phase (see below). This 
training ended when both subjects pressed their key six times per condition.  
 Thereafter, participant and confederate carried out the three operant conditions 
(subject, confederate, ambiguous). In the subject condition, both screens displayed the 
participant’s name (in order to make the participant believe that the tone is triggered by 
his/her key-press). In the confederate condition both screens displayed the confederate’s 
name (in order to make the participant believe that the effect is caused by the 
confederate). In the ambiguous condition both screens displayed a sequence of rhombs 
‘#####’ (in order to make participant believe that s/he may or may not trigger the tone). 
We told the participant that, in the latter condition, the probability that the tone followed 
her/his action or the confederate’s action was equally distributed. Importantly, contrary to 
the training sessions, during the test phase the tone was always triggered by the 
participant’s key-press and never by the confederate’s key-press, regardless of whether 
the participant’s or the confederate’s name (or a sequence of rhombs) was shown on the 
screen. In order to prevent participants from understanding that they always triggered the 
tone (on the basis of the temporal contiguity between their action and the sound), in all 
three operant conditions the participant and the confederate were asked to execute a key-
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press within the shaded arc (Figure 5). In particular, they were required to execute the 
movement when the clock-hand passed for the first time through the shaded area such 
that participant and confederate pressed the key at about the same time.  
 
 
Figure 5. Illustration of the experimental set-up of the test phase. Our confederate sat on the right of the 
real participants. They were separated by a card board and shared the same keyboard to trigger the sounds. 
Both saw the same stimuli on the screens. The event they had to report was displayed above the clock. The 
name of the participant/confederate/a sequence of rhombs was shown blow the clock (see text for details). 
Both used a keypad to indicate the moment at which the event of interest appeared (as a matter of course, 
our confederate feigned to answer). 
 
 
 Since we used three different SOAs, participants were unable to tell that they actually 
triggered the sound in all conditions. Moreover, in order to strengthen the participants’ 
causal beliefs in the three conditions, the confederate deactivated the participants’ key 
once or twice per confederate and ambiguous block. In these trials the confederate 
triggered the tone himself, from time to time even during the second rotation of the 
clock-hand. As in the second training session, the tone was delivered randomly 350, 550 
or 750 ms after the key-press. Notice that the probability that the tone is presented at the 
next possible SOA increases with increasing SOA (given that it has not been presented at 
the previous SOA(s)). At least this would be the case if the probability of tone 
presentation was the same across the SOAs. This phenomenon, known as the hazard 
function (Luce, 1991), entails foreperiod effects due to expectancy (Drazin, 1961; Keller 
& Van Der Schoot, 1978; Näätänen, 1970). To avoid these effects we kept the 
conditional probability of the occurrence of the tone after each of the three intervals 
constant. The corrected frequencies were such that the probability of the presentation of 
the tone at each of the three possible moments was 0.5. The formulas we used to 
calculate corrected frequencies were as follows (Näätänen, 1970): 
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(1)  
(2)  
(3)  
(4)  
 
where n is the number of trials for each belief condition, n1 is the number of trials in 
which the sound appears with a SOA of 350 ms, n2 is the number of trials in which the 
sound appears with a SOA of 550 ms and so forth. Keeping constant conditional 
probabilities necessitated including very few trials in which no tone was delivered 
(NoTone).  
When the clock-hand disappeared participants were asked to report the clock-hand 
position at which the given event occurred. The confederate’s screen displayed the 
participant’s answers, which allowed him to monitor her/his performance. Moreover, 
participants were asked to answer the question ‘‘Who triggered the tone?’’ by pressing 
one of two keys (‘ME’/‘HIM’). During the subject and the confederate belief condition 
(where participants ‘knew’ who triggered the sound) participants were instructed to 
answer this question according to the name displayed on the screen, otherwise, they 
could not pass to the next trial. This permitted us to strengthen participants’ association 
between name and causal role. However, in the ambiguous condition participants had to 
tell who was the origin of the sound.  
The test phase consisted of 8 blocks of movement judgment and eight blocks of 
sound judgment (in which participants had to judge the movement and the tone, 
respectively.) The 16 blocks were presented alternately with block presentation being 
counterbalanced between subjects. Belief conditions (subject, confederate, ambiguous) 
were randomly distributed within each judgment type block. Likewise, SOAs were 
randomly distributed within each belief condition. Each block consisted of 24 trials (eight 
trials per belief condition). Before starting the test phase, participants ran one block of 
training per judgment type.  
At the end of the experiment participants were asked whether they actually believed 
that: (i) they always triggered the sound when their name was displayed on the screen; 
(ii) the confederate triggered the sound when his name was displayed on the screen. They 
were also asked whether they believed that, in the ambiguous condition, the probability 
that the tone followed their action or the confederate’s action was equally distributed. 
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b Data analysis 
The mean estimation error (the difference between estimated and actual onset of the 
given event) was calculated for each condition. Anticipatory estimates are represented as 
negative values. In order to calculate binding scores we subtracted each subject’s mean 
estimation error in the baseline conditions from the mean estimation error for the same 
event in the operant conditions. For example, the mean estimation error of a voluntary 
action occurring alone (baseline) was subtracted from the mean estimation error of the 
voluntary action in a given operant condition (e.g., confederate condition, 350 ms). 
Likewise, the mean estimation error of the tone occurring alone was subtracted from 
mean estimation error of the tone triggered by a key-press in a given operant condition. 
The resulting perceptual shifts measure binding between actions and effects. We ran a 
separate analysis for the ambiguous condition, since, in this condition, participants had to 
carry out a double task. Here participants were not only asked to determine the time at 
which the event in question occurred but also to determine who triggered the tone. In the 
subject and confederate condition, by contrast, participants carried out a simple task. 
Here they only had to report the time of the event in question. 
 
c Results 
Two participants were excluded from the analysis, because they realized that they 
triggered the tone in all conditions. The rest of the participants believed that they 
triggered the sound when their name was displayed on the screen and the confederate 
triggered the sound when his name was displayed. However, all of them had the strong 
impression of causing the tone during almost all the ambiguous trials. The trials in which 
no tone was delivered and values ±2 standard deviations from the mean were excluded 
from the analysis. A repeated-measures ANOVA, on sound estimates (defined as the 
difference between the actual and the perceived onset of the sound) in the baselines with 
SOA as factor, was conducted. As was to be expected, there was no significant effect of 
SOA. Thus, we collapsed across SOAs to calculate the sound baseline. 
 
 Subject vs. confederate belief condition 
Sound estimations. A repeated-measures ANOVA on sound binding scores (the 
difference between the estimation error for the sound in the baseline condition and the 
estimation error for the sound in the operant conditions) with belief (subject, confederate) 
and SOA (350, 550, 750 ms) as factors was conducted. The main effect of belief was 
highly significant F(1, 33) = 9.2989, p = .0045. As predicted, we observed stronger 
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anticipation in the subject belief condition than in the confederate belief condition 
(Figure 6).  
 
 
Figure  6. Mean sound binding scores in ms for the subject and confederate belief conditions. 
 
 
The interaction between Belief and SOA was not significant F(2, 66) = .56853, p = 
.56911. To examine absolute binding effects for the sound, paired t-tests comparing the 
baseline with the subject belief condition and the confederate belief condition, 
respectively, were carried out. One-tailed t-Tests showed that the sound was significantly 
anticipated in the subject belief condition t(33) = 2,01, p = .0026, but not in the 
confederate belief condition t(33) = 0,18, p = .426. All in all, the pattern of results, thus, 
corroborates that prior causal belief influences the temporal perception of sensory action 
consequences, with the subject belief condition resulting in stronger binding than the 
confederate belief condition. 
Movement estimations. A repeated-measures ANOVA on movement binding 
scores (the difference between the estimation error for the movement in the baseline 
condition and the estimation error for the movement in the operant conditions) with 
Belief (subject, confederate) and SOA (350, 550, 750 ms) as factors was conducted. 
Neither the main effect of Belief F(1, 33) = .83128, p = .3685; (Figure 7), nor the 
interaction between Belief and SOA was significant F(2, 66) = .13939, p = .87015. To 
assess absolute binding scores, paired t-tests comparing the baseline with the subject 
belief and the confederate belief condition (collapsed across SOAs) were carried out. We 
found that the movement was significantly anticipated in both the subject t(33) = 2.62 p = 
.006 and the confederate belief condition t(33) = 2.07, p = .026. 
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Figure  7. Mean movement binding scores in ms for the subject and confederate belief conditions. 
 
 
 Ambiguous condition 
All the participants told us that they had the strong impression of causing the tone during 
almost all the ambiguous trials. This made the ambiguous condition more similar to 
subject belief condition than to the confederate condition. Nonetheless, participants tried 
to equally distribute their causality responses on ‘me’ and ‘him’ answers. Accordingly, 
analyzing this condition separately for the two answers is impossible. So, we calculate 
movement estimations and sound estimations irrespective of the distinction ‘me’ and 
‘him’. We carried out paired t-Tests comparing the baseline estimations with the 
movement and the sound estimations, respectively, of the ambiguous condition 
(collapsed across SOAs). The t-tests showed that the sound t(33) = 1.83, p = .0037 and 
the movement t(33) = 4.93, p = .0000 were significantly anticipated in the ambiguous 
condition compared to the baseline (Figure 8).  
Hence, the pattern of results of the ambiguous condition strongly resembles the 
results obtained in the subject belief condition. The finding that, in the ambiguous 
condition, participants believed that they were the origin of the sound is in agreement 
with previous studies which showed an egocentric bias in attribution of action in 
ambiguous context (Daprati et al., 1997; Franck et al., 2001; van den Bos & Jeannerod, 
2002). 
 
 
 113 
 
 
Figure  8. Mean binding scores in ms for both movement estimation and sound estimation in the 
ambiguous condition. 
 
 
d Discussion 
The present study tested the hypothesis that intentional binding is modulated by prior 
causal beliefs. Our study provides support for this hypothesis. We found that binding 
effects for a tone were significantly larger when participants were convinced that their 
actions triggered the tone, compared to when they were convinced that the confederate’s 
action triggered the tone. Notice that both belief conditions matched in terms of temporal 
expectancy and voluntary action control, in fact the tone was always triggered by the 
participants’ actions. 
Our findings are in general agreement with previous data which showed that both 
causality and voluntary action are necessary for intentional binding to emerge (Buehner 
& Humphreys, 2009; Cravo et al., 2009). For instance, in a recent study 
Cravo et al., (2009) used a variation of the launching effect proposed by 
Michotte, (1963). In some blocks, participants controlled the launch stimulus; in other 
blocks the launch stimulus was externally controlled. In addition, in two conditions 
(collision vs. non-collision), they varied the causal connection between the stimuli they 
used in their launching setting in order to induce the participants to get a high or low 
impression of causality. Temporal binding was found in the presence of both voluntary 
action and high causality only. One possible explanation for our results is that 
participants allocated more attention to the sensory consequence when they believed that 
they were its origin. However, this simple explanation seems to us to be unlikely since 
we did not find participants’ estimates to show more variability in the confederate belief 
condition compared to the subject belief condition. Instead, we suggest that to understand 
how prior causal beliefs influence intentional binding we need to distinguish two signals 
that the brain can use to determine the onset-time of a sensory action effect. First, it can 
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use internal prediction provided by the forward model (Wolpert, 1997). Second, it can 
use the ‘external’ signal, i.e., the actual sensory feedback. In the case of passively 
presented stimuli, the brain has to rely on the ‘external’ signal only. In the case of stimuli 
triggered by a voluntarily movement, on the other side, it can use both internal prediction 
and external signal, thus yielding the perceived shift in time. According to the 
comparator model of motor control, internal prediction is used to provide internal 
feedback of the predicted outcome of an action which can be used before sensory 
feedback is available, thereby shifting earlier in time the perceived occurrence of action 
effects (Wolpert, 1997).  
 We suggest that prior causal belief influences how reliable the brain considers the 
information provided by the internal forward model to be. When people believe that they 
are the author of an upcoming sensory event, predictive signals are considered to be 
reliable, if they believe that someone else is the origin of the upcoming stimulus event, 
predictive signals are considered to be unreliable. If, as 
Moore and colleagues' (2008; 2009a; 2009b) suggest, the sense of agency depends on a 
Bayesian cue integration process that is based on a weighted combination of different 
cues, then our results can be explained by assuming that in the subject and confederate 
belief conditions the internally anticipated effect get high and low weighs, respectively. 
Accordingly, the results of the ambiguous condition could be taken to show that under 
uncertainty, participants use sensorimotor information to guide their experience of action. 
It is only if external cues to agency are sufficiently compelling that sensorimotor 
information is overridden. Notice that, in the confederate condition, there was no 
significant shift in perceived stimulus onset-times at all (compared to the baseline). This 
might be taken to indicate that internal prediction did not play any role in this condition. 
Thus, a more radical explanation of our findings would be that prior causal belief 
influences whether or not the action’s consequence is predicted in the first place. If the 
system believes not to trigger the upcoming stimulus why should it bother to try to 
predict the event? 
Our results can also be explained in terms of the ‘pre-activation model’ of sensory 
attenuation of self-generated sensory consequences that has recently been suggested by 
Cardoso-Leite et al. (2010). Cardoso-Leite and colleagues suggest that the preparation or 
execution of a voluntary action results in pre-activity of the sensory network that 
represent the action’s expected perceptual consequence, thus increasing the mean level of 
activity in this network to some pedestal level. This assumption is corroborated by an 
fMRI study from Kühn, Seurinck, Fias, & Waszak (2010) who found an increase in 
activity in the parahippocampal place area (PPA) and fusiform face area (FFA) for 
actions that in a previous training phase have triggered houses and faces, respectively. 
PPA and FFA are considered to represented houses and face perceptually (Epstein & 
Kanwisher, 1998; Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997). Cardoso-Leite and colleagues 
suggest sensory attenuation to be due to the fact that discrimination of the signal 
activation (of the real stimulus) from the pedestal level is more difficult than 
discrimination of the signal activation from the baseline level (i.e., in a condition without 
effect anticipation, in which baseline activity is not raised to pedestal levels). The same 
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model can also explain a shift of the perceived onset-time of anticipated sensory action 
consequences: an action effect might reach the threshold of awareness faster, if the 
activity in its neural representation starts from the pedestal level than when it starts from 
the baseline level. Thus, signal accumulation for passively presented stimuli takes longer 
to reach the threshold of awareness than signal accumulation for action effects, since the 
perceptual representation of the latter has already been pre-activated by internal motor 
signals. 
To explain our results by means of the pre-activation account, we just need to 
assume, very similar to what we suggested above, that the effect is only predicted, or 
more efficiently, if the agent believes that s/he is the origin of the upcoming sensory 
event. This would bring about that accumulation of sensory evidence starts from a higher 
level in the subject than in the confederate belief condition, resulting in a shift of the 
perceived onset in the former condition compared to the latter. 
Contrary to the perception of the tone, we did not find any influence of causal belief 
on the temporal perception of the movement. This finding suggests that binding effects of 
the movement and of the sensory consequence that have been reported in previous 
studies (Haggard, Clark, et al., 2002; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2003; Wenke, Waszak, & 
Haggard, 2009) may be based on different mechanisms. This notion is in agreement with 
a recent study by Moore et al., (2010). These authors demonstrated that a disruption of 
pre-SMA function by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) affected the perception of 
the time of the sensory effect but not of the movement. Importantly, some studies point 
out that pre-SMA has a pivotal role in the prediction of sensory consequences. 
Ikeda et al. (1999), for example, emphasize its role in both action preparation and 
anticipatory processing of warning signals prior to action. Likewise, disruption of pre-
SMA activity has been found to abolish sensory suppression during voluntary movement 
(Patrick Haggard & Whitford, 2004), a phenomenon that has been linked to predictive 
mechanisms (Blakemore et al., 2002). Taken together, one might, thus, argue that the 
binding effect of the sensory consequence (but not of the movement) depends on internal 
predictive information. This would be in agreement with our hypothesis that prior causal 
belief influences the way in which internal predictive signals are processed.  
We would like to point out two caveats though. First, Moore & Haggard (2008) 
showed that both predictive and postdictive mechanisms contribute to the temporal 
perception of one’s movement. Thus, we cannot exclude the possibility that postdictive 
mechanisms are also involved on the temporal perception of the sound and that it is these 
postdictive processes that prior causal belief influences. 
Second, we did not find the usual binding effect for the movement estimation. This 
unexpected finding cannot be easily explained by existing accounts of intentional 
binding. We believe that it is due to the fact that we assessed intentional binding in a 
social setting. This supposition is corroborated by a recent study of 
Strother, House, & Obhi (2010) who observed the movement effect to be absent in a 
social setting. They suggest that their results are due to paradigm-specific factors 
resulting from the fact that participants performed the task in duos. The social setting, 
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thus, seems to influence movement estimations in particular. According to the paradigm 
of social facilitation subjects’ performances may be affected in various ways by the 
presence of a co-actor (Bond & Titus, 1983; Zajonc, 1965).  
Furthermore motor responses seem to be specially affected by social settings 
(Zajonc, 1965). In our study participants freely decided when to execute their movement 
which makes their own movement highly attended. Several studies point out that when 
subjects are asked to estimate the time at which they initiated a finger movement, the 
estimated time of awareness consistently anticipated the actual starting time of the 
movement by 50–80 ms (Libet et al., 1983; McCloskey, Colebatch, Potter, & Burke, 
1983; Obhi, Planetta, & Scantlebury, 2009). This suggests that participants tend to report 
the time at which they intended to move and not the actual movement itself. We 
speculate that, in the presence of a co-actor, participants attend more on the moment at 
which they intended to execute the movement, thus reporting even earlier movement 
onset-times. More research is needed to clarify these issues. 
In conclusion, it has been assumed that an action producing intentional binding 
needs to be voluntary and that the effect needs to be predictable. However, our results 
show that these two factors are not sufficient for the emergence of intentional binding: 
causal belief seems to be another essential precondition for the effect to emerge. At the 
same time, our results seem 
to suggest that high-level contextual information influences sensorimotor processes 
responsible for generating intentional binding. 
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APPENDIX 2: 
Supplementarry result for Study 2 
 
Figure 1 Appendix 2: On this figure we present the pattern of the interaction between 
Contrast (C0 VS C1) and Congruency (Congruent VS Incongruent).  No significant 
interaction was found between these two factor.  
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 Figure 2 Appendix 2:  On this figure we present the interaction between the Contrast (Hit 
and misses (C1) vs RC and FA (C0)) and the accuracy (Hit and RC vs Fa and misses). No 
significant interaction was found. The pattern seems to indicate that the isolated component 
contributes to the perception of intensity and its judgement.   
 
 
Taken together this two results suggest that more investigation of the effect of action effect 
prediction on the stimulus perception function of the stimulus intensity could lead to a 
better understanding of the mechanisms underlying the prediction of the action’s 
consequences. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
 
 
 Figure 1 Appendix 3: On this figure are presented the responses of R1 and R2 neurons to a 
left tilted stimulus when R1 is preactivated or not. This is a match for the condition 
incongruent (Left tilted gabord is presented while a right tilted gabord is predicted) vs the 
neutral condition (leftward (or rightward ) tilted  grating is presented while no prediction is 
made).  
This suggests that the identification of an incongruent stimulus is worse than a neutral 
stimulus. Thus the preactivation hypothesis predicts an increase in identification 
performance for congruent trial  and a decrease in identification performance for an 
incongruent trial both compared to the identification performance in a neutral condition (e.g 
when no predictions are made). 
